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II. Executive Summary 
 
The detrimental impact of corruption on society and economic well-being in both 
developed and developing countries is well established. International business 
provides ample opportunity for engaging in a variety of corrupt activities, from 
bribing of public officials and others in positions of power for obtaining contracts, 
licences and tax concessions to price fixing and bid rigging. Increased awareness of 
the negative impact of corruption has over recent years led to the introduction of a 
broad spectrum of measures designed to combat corruption including in the private 
sector. These measures involve a range of stakeholders and regulatory approaches 
(both legal and non-legal). The essential questions now concern the extent to which 
these are achieving their objectives in terms of tackling corruption. 
 
This Interim Report starts with a discussion of the current anti-corruption framework 
and then proceeds with an examination of the available empirical research to establish 
how corruption in the business sector is addressed. Though these earlier surveys 
usefully highlight some general themes they are not directly comparable, provide only 
a limited understanding of the issue, and raise many unanswered questions. Sections 2 
and 3 of this Report thus provide the context for the present authors’ own survey. 
Sections 4 and 5 discuss in detail the design and implementation of this survey (to 
date), which aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the extent to 
which key stakeholders are aware of and respond to different anti-corruption 
measures, the activities they are involved in for the purpose of combating corruption, 
and the factors which influence their behaviour in relation to corruption.  As well as 
providing valuable insights with respect to company views and experiences this 
research is unique in also surveying NGOs. The findings of this research project 
should therefore lead to a greater understanding of stakeholder practices and 
perceptions, and consequently of how anti-corruption efforts might be strengthened. 
Whilst it would be premature to draw conclusions at this pilot stage, the findings of 
the pilot survey discussed in Section 6 highlight the value of investigating stakeholder 
views in this way, as well as raising some interesting possibilities regarding 
assumptions about their actions and motivations and additional questions for the next 
phase of the survey. 
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Section 1 
Combating Corruption in International Business: Introduction 
 
In the world of international commerce kickbacks3 and bribes4 are common 
phenomena. Until recently, corruption was a taboo subject even though it was widely 
known that companies often resorted to such practices when dealing with those 
working in the public sector, be they domestic or foreign public officials. In the mid 
1970s, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) found that illegal foreign 
payments to foreign public officials and foreign politicians were widespread in the US 
corporate sector.5 This led to national legal reform and saw the enactment of the US 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (FCPA). However, it was not until the mid-1990s 
that the international community responded to the persistent calls for action with 
regional and international conventions. Undoubtedly, the US played a major role in 
lobbying for an international response to what it saw as a global problem that 
seriously affected competitiveness in the world of international business. Further 
impetus for international measures was also generated by studies from various 
institutions including the World Bank (WB) which drew attention to the economic 
and social impact of corruption, for instance the close link between corruption, 
development and poverty (Elliott, 1997; UNDP, 1997). This saw the adoption and 
ratification of a series of regional and international anti-corruption conventions in 
quick succession from the mid 1990s to the early part of this century. 
 
Ratification of anti-corruption conventions and their implementation in the national 
laws of a country of themselves are insufficient to control corruption. Apart from 
reliance on effective enforcement, the mere ‘letter of the law’ is likely to be 
inadequate in bringing about the necessary changes where other issues are not 
addressed. Companies with substantial economic might and which are guided by 
profit maximisation and obligations towards their investors have the potential to drive 
a state’s agenda and policies (including investigation and enforcement of corrupt 
practices) and to engage in questionable and illegal activities in order to obtain or 
retain business. Just as ‘all is fair in love and war’ so it seems ‘all is fair in business’. 
                                                 
3 Part of an income paid to a person having influence over the size or payment of the income by some 
illegal arrangement. 
4 To promise, offer or give something, often illegally, to procure services or gain influence. 
5 Committee on Banking and Urban Affairs, Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on 
Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices (1976). 
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Against this background, if any progress is to be made in the fight against corruption, 
it is important to ensure that companies recognise the responsibilities which they owe 
to other stakeholders such as local communities and society at large and that they 
behave in a responsible manner that takes into account the private sector role in social 
issues, environmental protection and the eradication of poverty. In other words, 
corporations must see themselves as having social responsibilities to enable 
meaningful progress towards fighting corruption.  
 
Of recent, it seems, companies are moving away from their image of profit-
centeredness and ruthless exploitation and embracing socially responsible behaviour 
(often termed corporate social responsibility or CSR) by adopting various sector 
specific or bespoke codes of conduct that promote integrity, transparency and good 
corporate citizenship within the corporation and in their dealings with others. Much of 
this change in corporate attitudes seems to have been triggered by civil society, that is 
activists, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the media who have publicised 
widely, for instance, illegal logging activities of multinationals in rainforests, 
environmental pollution at industrial plants and human tragedies such as the one in 
Bhopal (India) caused by the Union Carbide factory. Increasingly civil society sees 
itself as a major player in raising local and global awareness of social issues and as 
having the capacity to mould the behaviour of state and non-state actors and this 
status is reinforced by the increased presence of such stakeholders at meetings and 
negotiations within the international institutions. 
 
Further impetus towards CSR was also provided by developments in international 
institutions. The voluntary standards adopted in 2000 by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in its Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (GME) promoted international voluntary standards for good corporate 
conduct in areas such as employment, environment and corruption. The United 
Nations (UN) joined forces in promoting CSR with its adoption of the UN Global 
Compact (UNGC) in 2000 that set out core standards to be supported and embraced 
by companies. The UNGC initially promoted human rights, labour standards and the 
environment. However soon after the adoption of the United Nations Conventions 
Against Corruption (UN Convention) in 2003, UNGC adopted Principle 10 in 2004 
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which states that “[b]usinesses should work against corruption in all its forms 
including extortion and bribery”. 
 
As soon as strategies such as those outlined above are adopted to resolve a socio-
economic problem the immediate questions that arise concern whether they have had 
any impact on the ground. Have those affected by the strategies responded or altered 
their behaviour in a manner that meets the anticipated outcomes of the strategies? If 
they have not what are the reasons for this and how can the strategies be 
improved/strengthened to meet the objectives? 
 
The same questions arise equally in relation to corruption and can be usefully broken 
down into further questions. Among these are: 
 
1)  Are the companies aware of anti-corruption conventions and relevant soft-law 
instruments? How do they perceive these instruments? What impact, if any, 
have the different instruments had on companies: have they adjusted or changed 
their behaviour in relation to those?  
2)  Have the companies voluntarily adopted codes of conduct or internal measures 
that promote CSR? Do these include a commitment to tackling bribery or 
corrupt behaviour on their part, and on the part of their agents and those in their 
supply chain?  Is CSR a useful tool for combating corruption?  
3)  What role do NGOs play in combating corruption? How have NGOs applied and 
promoted the tools for tackling corruption? In what ways have NGOs worked 
with the private sector to address corruption and to what extent has NGO 
activity and involvement impacted upon companies? Do NGOs play a wider role 
in publicising and educating the public at large about anti-corruption measures? 
 
This project seeks to address these questions with a view to identifying the various 
means through which current anti-corruption strategies could be improved.
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Section 2 
Current Strategies for Combating Corruption 
 
An evaluation of the impacts of anti-corruption strategies assumes an understanding 
of the nature and regulatory characteristics of these and it necessary, therefore to 
discuss at this point the main approaches that have emerged. Of course, much has 
been written about the far-reaching, damaging consequences of corruption on 
development and a nation’s wealth.6 These need not be rehearsed in detail for present 
purposes. Corruption is certainly not a new phenomenon. However, the forces of 
globalisation and the resulting flow of capital to hitherto untapped markets in 
developing and least developed countries with the potential for sizeable returns 
present ample opportunities for grand corruption. Despite the relaxation of trade 
barriers as a result of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and 
associated agreements, bureaucratic hurdles are all too common in the form of 
permits, licences, overcoming land acquisition rules and planning permissions and 
registration requirements in order to engage in business activities such as foreign 
investment, export/import contracts and sales of know-how. The bureaucratic 
requirements in some countries can be cumbersome and time-consuming. This opens 
the doors for corruption both from the supply side (the company as bribe giver to the 
public official) and the demand side (the public sector or politicians as bribe taker) 
thus distorting the decision-making process and the competitive business 
environment.  
 
The current global strategy for combating corruption is multi-pronged and includes 
(1) regulation that brings about harmonisation across jurisdictions through the 
ratification and implementation of anti-corruption conventions; (2) self-regulation 
which is informal in character and promotes the adoption of voluntary codes of 
conduct; (3) strengthening of accounting practices and auditing standards; (4) 
mobilisation of public opinion through NGOs and engagement of civil society with 
both the private and public sector; and (5) the tying of conditions to infrastructure 
improvement loans to developing countries from international and state development 
agencies such as the World Bank (WB) and US Agency for International 
Development (USAID). These conditions range from legal reform and transparency in 
                                                 
6 For example, see HMSO (2000); Gray & Kaufmann (1998). 
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public sector structures and management to civil service and setting up of anti-
corruption commissions.7 
 
2.1. Regulation  
2.1.1 Defining Corruption 
 
Corruption as a concept has moral, social, cultural and economic connotations. It is 
interpreted in a variety of senses from moral turpitude, intolerable social and political 
changes to undue economic or material advantage obtained by an individual in a 
position of power by virtue of that position. This makes it difficult to arrive at a 
satisfactory generic definition. Nevertheless countless attempts have been made to 
provide one. As the few examples given below indicate the definitions focus on the 
exploitation by an individual of his power for private gain. For Kennedy (1999:415)  
 
“corruption is a code word for ‘rent seeking’ – using power to extract a higher 
price than that which would be possible in an arms-length or freely 
competitive bargain – and for practices which privilege locals”  
 
while for Nye (1967:419) corruption is  
 
“behavior which derives from the formal duties of a public role because of 
private regarding (personal, close, family, private clique) pecuniary or status 
gains, violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery (use of reward to pervert 
the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of 
patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and 
misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-
regarding uses”. 
 
The WB8 and the major international anti-corruption NGO, Transparency 
International (TI),9 also emphasise abuse of power entrusted in a person for personal 
gain in their definitions. This emphasis is also reflected in the numerous anti-
                                                 
7 Some examples of key anti-corruption instruments are listed in Table II. 
8 The World Bank defines it simply as “the abuse of public office for private gain”. 
9 For TI “[c]orruption is operationally defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain.” It 
further “differentiates between ‘according to rule’ corruption and ‘against the rule’ corruption. 
Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive preferential treatment for something that the 
bribe receiver is required to do by law, constitute the former. The latter, on the other hand, is a bribe 
paid to obtain services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing”. 
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corruption conventions that criminalise behaviour ranging from bribery, the most 
commonly understood manifestation of corruption that involves a fairly 
straightforward mutual relationship to the more complex such as peddling of influence 
and diversion of funds.  
 
2.1.2 Anti-corruption Conventions 
 
The period from 1996 to 2003 saw intense activity on the drafting and adoption of 
anti-corruption conventions. Below is a list of adopted inter-governmental 
conventions some of which are in force as indicated in the list.10 
 
1)  Organisation of American States Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption 1996 (OAS Convention). Came into force 6 March 1997. 
2)  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions 1997 (OECD Convention). Came into force 15 February 
1999. 
3)  Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 1999 (COE 
Convention). Came into force 1 July 2002. 
4)  Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight Against 
Corruption 2001 (ECOWAS Protocol). Not yet in force.  
5)  Southern Africa Development Community Protocol against Corruption 2001 
(SADC Protocol). Not yet in force.  
6)  African Union Convention of Preventing and Combating Corruption 2003 (AU 
Convention). Came into force 5 August 2006. 
7)  United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003 (UN Convention). Came 
into force 14 December 2005. 
 
It would be normal to expect these conventions to define the word ‘corruption’. 
However, in practice, the conventions, other than the SADC Protocol,11 refrain from 
                                                 
10 There is also an EU Convention on Corruption which focuses on bribery, active and passive, of 
community and national officials.  
11 Art 1 defines corruption as “any act referred to in Article 3 and includes bribery or any other 
behaviour in relation to persons entrusted with responsibilities in the public and private sectors which 
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providing a general definition of corruption but focus instead on specific types of 
corrupt behaviour. It is however possible on the basis of the offences created by these 
conventions to group them into two: ‘Group A’ and ‘Group B’ (see below).  
 
Corruption can occur in different contexts but much of the corruption reported is in 
the public sector, be it at the petty or at the grand level. Group A targets corruption in 
the public sector and addresses the issue of abuse/misuse of power by those in public 
office for private gain. Conventions falling within Group B focus on the abuse/misuse 
of power in the decision making process for obtaining an undue advantage and are 
broader in scope than those within Group A, by also including the private sector. Of 
course the types of misuse, and the kinds of undue advantage outlawed, vary between 
the conventions as the following paragraphs show. (See Table II summarising the 
offences created by the conventions). 
 
Group A 
 
The OAS Convention is the earliest anti-corruption convention with the prime 
objective of eradicating corruption in the performance of public functions. In brief, it 
creates corruption offences both in the context of mutual exchange between the 
offeror and the recipient (e.g. bribery) and where there is no mutual exchange (e.g. 
embezzlement); it includes corrupt activities of public officials and covers both 
passive bribery (solicitation and acceptance by a public official of a benefit in return 
for an act or omission) and active bribery (offering or granting of a benefit to a public 
official in return for the doing or not doing of an act). It has an extra-territorial 
dimension and it makes active bribery of a foreign public official an offence; and 
creates a (controversial)12 offence of illicit enrichment. 
 
The next convention in chronological order which falls within Group A is the OECD 
Convention.13 Unlike the OAS Convention the OECD Convention deals only with 
transnational bribery and criminalises active bribery of a foreign public official in the 
context of international business transactions.  
                                                                                                                                            
violates their duties as public officials, private employees, independent agents or other relationships of 
that kind and aimed at obtaining undue advantage of any kind for themselves or others”.  
12 Controversial in human rights terms since the onus is on the accused to show the source of his funds. 
13 This was preceded by an Anti- bribery Recommendation in 1994. 
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 Group B 
 
The conventions that fall within this group are wider in ambit and include both the 
public and private sector. The earliest convention to include both sectors is the COE 
Convention, which focuses on the abuse of power in return for an undue advantage 
regardless of the context in which it occurs. It also takes a comprehensive approach in 
construing the term ‘public official’ and dispels doubts about which services are or are 
not included in the public sector by including specific provisions. Corruption however 
is construed within a narrow band that includes acts of active and passive bribery both 
at the domestic and international level, and trade in influence over persons in the 
public sector. An accounting offence is also created to address fraudulent practices.  
 
The next three conventions in the chronological list, SADC Protocol, AU Convention 
and the UN Convention are more comprehensive. The first two are regional 
conventions and likely therefore to have a limited impact unlike the UN Convention 
which is an international convention.  
 
The list of specific acts of corruption made illegal by the SADC Protocol includes 
active and passive bribery be it by a public official or a person working in the private 
sector, act or omission by a public official for illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or 
a third party, diversion by a public official of property, monies or securities of the 
State, individual or independent agency received by virtue of his position for his own 
benefit or that of a third party, the fraudulent use or concealment of property obtained 
from corrupt acts and participation as principal, co-principal, agent, instigator, 
collaborator or accessory after the fact. The Protocol also has a transnational aspect 
and includes the bribery of a foreign public official in its list of offences.  
 
The AU Convention follows in the style of the SADC Protocol in listing specific acts 
of corruption and related offences. Its list includes passive and active bribery in the 
public and the private sector, the controversial provision on illicit enrichment, trading 
in influence, diversion of funds and concealment of funds resulting from acts of 
corruption. Laundering or concealment of proceeds from corrupt activities is also 
made an offence. The AU Convention includes an interesting provision on the funding 
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of political parties. The only convention to do so, it expects the Contracting States to 
proscribe the use of funds acquired through illegal and corrupt practices to finance 
political parties and incorporate the principle of transparency in such funding. The AU 
Convention however lacks a transnational dimension in not including bribery of a 
foreign public official in its list. 
 
The UN Convention, last in the chronological list, is more comprehensive than the 
other Group B conventions discussed above. It criminalizes bribery of national 
officials, foreign public officials and officials of public international organisations, 
bribery in the private sector, embezzlement of property both in the public and private 
sector, trading in influence, illicit enrichment, abuse of function and laundering and 
concealing the proceeds of corruption. In taking a comprehensive approach it also 
addresses aspects that may hinder enforcement and criminalises the use of physical 
force, threats or the offer of a bribe to induce false testimony or to interfere in the 
giving of testimony or production of evidence. Equally intimidation of officials in 
order to interfere with the exercise of their official duties in respect of the offences 
created by the Convention is made an offence. 
 
2.2 Self-Regulation  
 
Commerce is no stranger to self-regulation. Since mediaeval times, instead of looking 
to the State for drafting suitable legislation, it has regulated its behaviour through the 
adoption of rules and standards which acted as a common language, to govern their 
business transactions, (termed lex mercatoria). The use of the standard trade term CIF 
(Cost, Insurance and Freight) in international sales is one such example. Rapid growth 
in international trade also saw the setting up of various organisations such as the 
London Corn Trade Association and the Grain and Feed Trade Association that 
played a role in drafting standard contracts and in lobbying parliamentarians.  
 
Businesses are often subject to extortion in states with high levels of corruption and 
frequently resort to offering bribes in order to obtain or retain business, as the TI 
Bribe Payers’ Index indicates. If any headway is to be made against corruption it is 
important to engage the corporate sector. Voluntary adoption of codes of conduct 
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seems to be one way forward. The CSR movement has been very effective in making 
corporations more amenable to taking on environmental, human rights and labour 
standards issues. It should therefore be possible to convince them of the importance of 
behaving ethically in the context of corruption. There are numerous examples of the 
substantial steps that have been taken in this direction. These measures have been 
promoted by a variety of actors, international organisations representing business 
interests, trade/industry associations and international institutions. 
  
An international organisation, set up in the early part of the twentieth century, which 
has played an important role in harmonising rules and promoting the interests of 
business and adoption of good practices by businesses is the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC). As far back as 1975, it adopted the Rules on Extortion and Bribery 
for voluntary adoption by businesses, the earliest code of conduct to address the 
subject of anti-corruption. This has been replaced with a version adopted in 2005. The 
ICC has yet again taken centre stage in the drive towards anti-corruption and is 
actively promoting adoption of ethical codes by outlining the risks of corruption, 
including the loss of reputation, in its latest brochure ‘Business Case Against 
Corruption’ (2008). Equally, industry associations such as the Aerospace and Defence 
Industries Association of Europe (ASD) are also calling for voluntary adoption of 
industry specific corporate ethical standards, which includes anti-corruption, in order 
to protect the reputation of the industry, a consequence of the issues raised by the 
bribery allegations in respect of BAE’s Al-Yamamah contract with Saudi Arabia. 
 
The work towards widespread adoption of ethical codes is further consolidated by the 
International Standards Organisation, an organisation that balances the needs of 
business and broader needs of society, and which is currently working on drafting the 
Social Responsibility Code (ISO 26000) due for publication in 2010. And needless to 
say, the OECD has been instrumental alongside activists and NGOs in the move 
towards setting the standards of corporate behaviour and pushing the CSR agenda in a 
globalised society with its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.  
 
That CSR is an important element in the fight against corruption is also acknowledged 
by the UN anti-corruption regulatory framework. In Art 12(2), the UN Convention 
expects states to promote the development of “codes of conduct for the correct, 
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honourable and proper performance of the activities of business and all relevant 
professions and the prevention of conflicts of interest, and for the promotion of the 
use of good commercial practices among businesses and the contractual relations of 
business with the State”. 
 
2.3 Accounting and Auditing  
 
Accounting and auditing systems play a unique and specific role in combating 
corruption. The procedures adopted can be mandatory or voluntary. Internal rules and 
procedures adopted for these purposes are generally said to form part of a company’s 
Corporate Governance system while external controls may be legislative or based on 
guidelines such as those issued by the relevant stock exchange committees. These 
systems should provide an effective mechanism for the detection and, based on the 
principle of deterrence, prevention of corrupt payments and practices. 
 
Clear and effective accounting procedures should help to reduce the level of 
corruption by increasing the probability of acts of bribery being detected and reported. 
Transparency in accounting should help to reduce the information asymmetries that 
can allow corruption to go undetected, to fortify internal controls and to deter the 
demand side of bribery because of the increased risk of detection (Wu (2005:158)). 
The role of auditors is to check the results of accounting procedures, including 
financial statements, and to provide assurances of their accuracy. Thus auditors and 
accountants are regarded as important ‘gatekeepers’ within anti-corruption strategies.  
 
However, around the start of this century, notable problems emerged due to 
weaknesses in accounting and auditing rules and their implementation. These were 
highlighted most famously in the Enron/Arthur Anderson scandal. Several failings of 
the existing rules governing auditors were identified. One was the lack of 
independence of auditing firms.  While being considered a ‘public watchdog’ they are 
in fact employed by the company which they are auditing (Shapiro (2005:1029). The 
significant growth in the non-audit services offered by auditing firms, including 
management advice and the design of compliance systems which they would then 
audit, also raised questions about conflict of interest and the extent to which the audit 
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firms may be too closely dependant on their audited clients (Bratton (2003:1030)). 
Further, the rules based approach had also enabled auditors to engage in ‘creative 
compliance’, following the letter of the law but not its spirit (Bratton (2007:38); 
Shapiro (2005:1052-3)). 
 
The US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 was enacted to address identified problems 
associated with the independence of auditors and the rigour and transparency of 
auditing services. This Act included reforms such as prohibiting auditors from 
providing certain non-audit services to audit clients; establishing the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee the provision of auditing services 
and with a mandate to approve standards and to carry out inspections and impose 
penalties on audit firms for the purpose of their enforcement; requiring listed 
companies to appoint an audit committee comprised of independent directors with 
responsibility for oversight of appointed auditors; and requiring senior executives to 
personally certify that the company’s financial statements are fairly presented.  
 
The measures introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have come under criticism and 
include arguments about the independence of the PCAOB, the cost of compliance and 
its impact on businesses and that the auditors still wear two hats since they are still 
employed by the companies which they audit (Shapiro (2005); Wallace (2003)). 
However, it has also been associated with much greater transparency in auditing and 
with active enforcement. Whilst the recent reforms in the US have been the most 
prominent other developments in respect of accounting and auditing standards have 
also taken place. Stock exchange rules, such as the UK Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance (2006) provide guidelines on auditing and accounting arrangements as do 
instruments such as the OECD’s GME (see Part I: III, Disclosure) though these 
clearly are not of the same nature as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The extent to which all 
these measures impact on company behaviour is unclear.  
 
2.4 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
 
The widening interaction of NGOs with the community and media and its influence 
on the conscience of governments and international policy making institutions is 
 15
highly visible. Their influence on trade and environment policies in WTO 
negotiations provides an instance of their emerging role in the global arena (Bhagwati 
(2004)). Without doubt, NGOs are now regarded as important stakeholders in 
activities that have a social impact, from climate change, world trade, education and 
information technology to corruption. Transparency International (TI) is a major 
international anti-corruption NGO. While the publicity of corruption levels in 
different states, through its annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), is the most 
commonly known of its activities, its platform for anti-corruption activity is much 
wider. It monitors the implementation of anti-corruption legislation and compliance 
with international standards in various countries. TI’s United Kingdom chapter for 
instance speaks vociferously about the lack of clear corruption legislation in the UK 
and promotes the need for a corruption bill. Equally it has been a major critic, 
alongside two other NGOs, Corner House and Campaign Against Arms Trade, of the 
Serious Fraud Office’s decision to drop the investigation of the BAE/Al Yamamah 
slush fund on grounds of national interest (Carr & Outhwaite (2008)). TI also plays a 
major role in influencing public policy within governments and international law-
making bodies such as the OECD. Country integrity reports, which audit the state of 
corruption within a country, are another major contribution, providing a useful 
resource for planning remedial action within a state for policy-makers, international 
and state lending agencies and the corporate sector committed to Principle 10 of the 
UN Global Impact. 
 
It must be stressed that TI is not alone in taking on the anti-corruption agenda. There 
are local NGOs, too numerous to list here, who play an important role in educating the 
public and in exposing corrupt practices. For instance, in Korea and Thailand local 
NGOs in collaboration with the media have exposed corruption at local and national 
government levels that have resulted in convictions (Bhargava & Bologaita (2003)). 
Some of the local NGOs have also adopted novel ways of involving the citizens in 
reporting corruption. For instance, Public Affairs Centre in India has introduced a 
citizen’s report card system which enables citizens to publicise instances of 
corruption.  
 
That such extra legal influences are important in the fight against corruption is 
recognised by the international law instruments. The UN Convention in Art 13 
 16
requires states to take appropriate measures to promote the active participation of 
individuals and groups (such as community-based organisation and NGOs) outside 
the public sector thus endorsing the important role of NGOs in the fight against 
corruption. 
 
2.5 Infrastructural Loans and Conditions 
 
The WB, as a major international donor institution, had always been aware of 
corruption in the recipient countries but refrained from saying anything openly about 
the problem since it was largely seen as a political issue and thus beyond the remit of 
the WB. However, in 1996, on the strength of numerous studies on the close 
connection of corruption to poverty and economic growth, the WB with its mandate 
of reducing poverty and increasing economic growth took the bold stand of openly 
pledging its commitment to fighting “the cancer of corruption”. The WB sees 
corruption as a product of bad governance and weaknesses inherent in public sector 
institutions. Improving governance and public sector management are seen as the key 
to reducing corruption and the WB works proactively towards this by engaging with 
and helping recipient states to move towards good governance through legal reforms, 
including adopting anti-corruption legislation, civil service reform, transparency in 
public sector management, judicial reform and the setting up of anti-corruption 
bureaux. It also actively disseminates strategies for combating corruption through 
seminars and workshops. There is ample evidence that many countries have 
undertaken legal reform and restructured their civil service in ways that introduce 
integrity and transparency into the system along the lines suggested by the WB. 
Tanzania is one example of a state which has undertaken such measures as part of 
extensive anti-corruption reforms (Carr 2009).  
 
The WB is also unique in adopting sanctions in its anti-corruption strategy. So where 
there is evidence of fraud in bank financed projects, the WB can declare the 
ineligibility of the firm from taking part in future projects funded by the bank. The list 
of blacklisted firms is also made widely available. Other regional funding agencies 
such as the Asian Development Bank have adopted similar anti-corruption strategies 
including the sanctioning of firms who have engaged in illegitimate activities.  
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 State development agencies such as USAID (US Agency for International 
Development), NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development) and UK’s DFID 
(Department for International Development) have also tied conditions to loans and 
this has resulted in major legal reform, for instance, in African countries such as 
Mozambique, Uganda and Nigeria.  
 
The reforms recommended by these organisations in respect of anti-corruption 
legislation, national and international, neatly dovetail the legal framework adopted in 
the anti-corruption conventions thus strengthening the regulatory approaches to anti-
corruption. Indeed many of the recipient countries are parties to the regional 
conventions such as the AU Convention and the UN Convention.
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Section 3 
Anti-corruption Surveys 
 
The success of any adopted strategy to counter or resolve a social problem depends on 
its suitability to achieving the expected outcomes and its flexibility to adapt suitably 
in response to the assessment of its impact at the ground level. Questions as to the 
extent and the kind of impact are complex. The impact may be affected positively, 
negatively, indifferently or unpredictably by a number of variables including attitudes, 
expectations, cultures, social backgrounds, motivations and mores. So, just as 
strategies affect human behaviour, human behaviour also affects strategies and 
research into the impact of anti-corruption measures seeks to shed light on the these 
interactions. In the context of corruption in international business, a more refined 
understanding of the ways in which company behaviours, experiences and attitudes 
interact with adopted strategies is required. For instance, linking company perceptions 
on anti-corruption instruments and regulatory approaches to internal policies and 
activities could provide a means to identify and address ‘gaps’ or limitations which 
act as barriers to combating corruption. 
 
An assessment of the impact of anti-corruption strategies on businesses could be 
classified into: 
1) Experience of corruption; 
2) Awareness of anti-corruption strategies; 
3) Attitudes toward different anti-corruption strategies including views on their 
potential to combat corruption in a comparative context;  
4) Changes in corporate culture (covering a whole range of measures from 
adoption of codes, training of executives, use of reporting mechanisms and 
accounting and auditing practices);  
5) Motivations for executing changes, be they external or internal; 
6) Success of procedures adopted; 
7) Engagement with organisations promoting anti-corruption strategies such as 
NGOs;  
8) Prioritisation of social issues within corporate strategy; and 
9) Views on improving current strategies. 
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To date there is very limited data available to build a picture capable of addressing the 
above classifications. As noted, a source commonly referred to is the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI)14 produced by TI which scores countries based on 
perceptions of the public sector with scores ranging from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least 
corrupt). The CPI is derived from surveys and expert opinions. The 2007 index drew 
its information from the following sources: Asian Development Bank (ADB), African 
Development Bank (AfDB), Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment by the World Bank (CPIA), Economic 
Intelligence Unit (EIU), Freedom House Nations in Transit (FH), Global Insight 
Country Risk Ratings (GI), International Institute for Management Development, 
Lausanne (IMD). Merchant International Group (MIG), Political and Economic Risk 
Consultancy (PERC), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 
and the World Economic Forum (WEF). The selection of sources is guided by a 
number of criteria aimed at achieving some degree of uniformity of methodology. 
Among the criteria are whether the extent of corruption is measured independently of 
factors such as political instability or civil conflict, and whether they rank the 
countries according to the levels of corruption. However, the uniformity of 
methodology does not seem to extend to matters such as the type of questions asked, 
the type of respondents or the number of countries covered. By way of illustration, 
CPIA focuses on 77 countries that are eligible for funding from the WB, the BTI on 
125 less developed and transition countries while PERC on 15 countries. The focuses 
of the questions also vary. For instance, PERC focused on how serious the respondent 
considered the problem of corruption to be in the public sector whilst BTI focused on 
the government’s capacity to punish and contain corruption. 
Given the degree of divergence it would be reasonable to question the reliability of 
such indices. However it must be pointed out that corruption is a secret activity 
lacking a paper trail. Hence the observations and experiences of experts and opinions 
obtained through surveys of the public are important in so far as they reflect the extent 
of the problem within a given society and in particular sectors such as the public 
sector Although conclusions based on such evidence are inevitably affected by 
subjectivity as Kaufmann and Kraay (2008) state they nevertheless provide a 
                                                 
14 The World Bank also publishes Governance Indicators which includes linkages between corruption 
and development. See Kaufmann, Kraay, Massimo (2008). 
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perspective of what happens on the ground. For current purposes however the survey 
is not of much use since its focus is the incidence of corruption rather than the impact 
of the anti-corruption strategies, though it may be possible, based on comparison of 
scores with previous years, to make tentative statements about the increase or 
decrease in corruption of a particular country. 
 
There are of course a number of other surveys, general, sector, and country specific, 
carried out by, for instance, professional organisations and accountancy firms. A list 
of some of these surveys and their nature and scope is set out in Table III. The 
findings reported in these are discussed in sections 3.1- 3.7 below. The surveys 
examine business attitudes and practices with respect to corruption but as well as 
differing in terms of scope and research methods these surveys tend to have a limited 
focus and do not analyze key issues or the relationships between variables in detail. 
Not all of these focus specifically on corruption. Some focus on CSR but are included 
because they include corruption within the CSR agenda and are therefore relevant to 
the question of impact. Despite their limitations it is useful to review some of their 
key findings and themes since they give some indication of the levels of corruption 
experienced by responding companies, the ways in which they have responded to the 
need to combat corruption, both in terms of their attitudes towards regulatory 
measures and through the adoption of internal measures, and the broad differences 
noted between different sectors and country responses, as well as highlighting key 
areas in which data is lacking.  
 
3.1 Prevalence of Corruption 
The experience of bribery and corruption varies between surveys but loss of business 
and exposure to corruption are consistently identified as a concern.  
 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC) (2008)15 found that 78% of respondents believed 
that indirect payments (to agents, intermediaries, third parties) were prevalent among 
global companies and 76% believed this was true of ‘inappropriate gifts’.16 Similarly, 
                                                 
15 Confronting Corruption; The Business Case for an Effective Anti-Corruption Program. 
16 Other forms of corruption surveyed according to perceived prevalence were; non-cash payments, 
65%; sponsorships, 53%; political donations, 51%; employee expenses (e.g. bribes made with 
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substantial numbers of respondents indicated that their company had withdrawn from 
tenders or lost bids because of the threat or presence of corrupt practices.17 KPMG 
(2007)18 also reported high levels of corruption; it found that only 16% of companies 
perceived that bribery and corruption practices were 'never' used to gain contracts or 
commercial advantages abroad.19 Simmons & Simmons (2006)20 found that 43% of 
companies surveyed thought they had failed to win a new business contract or gain 
new business because a competitor had paid a bribe, over the past five years and one-
third considered this to be true for the past 12 months.21 A similar number of 
respondents (41%) specifically in the field of construction were found by Chartered 
Institute of Builders (CIOB)22 to have experienced corruption23 with higher numbers, 
often above 75%, experiencing corruption within given practices.24 Slightly more 
optimistic figures were reported by Ernst and Young (2008)25 who found that around 
a quarter of surveyed companies had experienced bribery or corruption in the last two 
years.26 The figures in this case may be affected by interviewer effects since 
telephone interviews were used for data collection (in most other cases questionnaires 
of some type were used) and by the more direct nature of the questions compared with 
the other surveys. With respect to SMEs (small medium enterprises), the Association 
                                                                                                                                            
employee/corporate credit cards), 40%; direct payments (e.g. payments made directly from company 
bank accounts or petty cash), 33%; other, 2%, don’t know, 1%. See PwC (2008), p.33).  
17 When asked to respond on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being accurate and 5 inaccurate, to the statement 
‘my company has withdrawn from a tender in the past because we were concerned over the expectation 
of ‘personal favours’, 19% of respondents responded ‘1’ and 23% responded ‘2’.  Similarly, 21% of 
respondents answered ‘1’ and 18% answered ‘2’ in response to the statement ‘my company has lost 
bids due to corrupt officials handling the bidding’. Twenty percent answered ‘1’ and 22% ‘2’ in 
response to the statement ‘our competitors have relied on bribes to improve their position’. Finally, 
20% responded ‘1’ and 24% responded ‘2’ to the statement ‘corruption risks precluded my company 
from entering specific markets or from pursuing significant opportunities that it would otherwise have 
considered’. 
18 Overseas Bribery and Corruption. 
19 Ten percent considered such practices were used 'frequently' and 36% considered they were used 
'occasionally'. Twenty-two percent perceived that such practices were used 'rarely' and 15% did not 
know. 
20 International Business Attitudes to Corruption. 
21 Based on date of survey (2006). 
22 Corruption in the UK Construction Sector. 
23 Eighteen percent of respondents answered ‘yes once’, to the question ‘have you personally ever been 
offered a bribe or incentive to engage in corrupt practice?’ Twenty-three percent answered ‘yes, on 
more than one occasion’, 59% answered ‘never’. 
24 See pp 7-17. 
25 Corruption or Compliance: Weighing the Costs 10th Global Fraud Survey. 
26 Twenty-four percent of surveyed companies answered ‘yes’ to the question ‘has your company had 
an incident of bribery or corruption in the last two years?’ Eighteen percent believed they had lost 
business to a competitor that had paid a bribe during that time frame and 23% answered ‘yes’ to the 
question ‘do you know if anyone in your company has ever been asked for a bribe to retain or win 
business?’ 
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of Certified Chartered Accountant  (ACCA)27 found that while 69% of respondents 
agreed that SMEs are likely to come across bribery and corruption in the course of 
their dealings, 49% did not believe corruption and bribery to be a cause of concern to 
SMEs. This may indicate relaxed or tolerant views of corruption or, as noted by 
ACCA, may indicate that while corruption is a recognised risk it is not yet identified 
as a day to day concern.  
 
Some findings also suggest that the occurrence of corruption is increasing or at best, 
not worsening. Ernst & Young (2008), Simmons and Simmons and the CIOB all 
reported that respondents felt that the problem of corruption was getting worse or that 
there had been and/or would be an increase in levels of corruption.28 That respondents 
have not yet realised an improvement in the presence of corruption in business 
operations clearly raises questions about the effectiveness of measures introduced thus 
far to combat corruption and what else is needed to address this problem. 
 
3.2 Country and Sector Variance 
Findings on corruption according to industry sector are not consistent. Ernst & Young 
(2008) found that mining (47%) and utilities (43%) were the sectors most likely to 
report that corrupt practices are prevalent in their sector. The energy sectors (oil, gas, 
electricity) were least likely to hold this view (30%). However, Simmons & Simmons 
indicated that companies in the oil and gas as well as the mining and construction 
sectors were most likely to have experienced a loss of business related to corruption.29 
Companies estimating the additional costs to an international project caused by 
corruption at more than one quarter were most likely to come from the construction 
(29%) defence (25%) and finance (8%) sectors. KPMG (2007) reports that when 
asked about the frequency of corrupt practices in their own sector, almost half of 
                                                 
27 Bribery and Corruption: The Impact on UK SMEs. 
28 Simmons & Simmons found that in three of the five jurisdictions surveyed previously in 2002, there 
had been a 'noticeable increase' in the proportion of businesses losing out to corrupt competitors (These 
were Hong Kong, the Netherlands and the US. Germany and the UK had seen some reduction over the 
past five years but not the past twelve months). Overall 42% of respondents expected to see the scale of 
corruption remain the same over the next five years, 32% thought it would increase and 23% thought 
that it would decrease. CIOB found that 16% of respondents considered that overall, the levels of fraud 
and corruption in the construction industry had increased over the past five years. Thirty percent 
considered that it had decreased and 54% thought that it had stayed the same. See also PwC (2007) 
29 The Ernst and Young report comments that their rankings, at least in respect of the energy sector, 
‘appear to be at odds with regulatory actions in the US, where the energy sector is currently facing 
widespread scrutiny for corrupt business practices from the DoJ and the SEC’. (p6).  
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respondents stated that it was below average, suggesting that respondents are either 
operating effective compliance programs or are unaware of the true scale of 
corruption within their industry.  
 
Variance by country also appears to be important. Ernst & Young found, for example, 
that Japanese companies reported experiencing much higher levels of corruption – 
72% said they had experienced an incident of bribery or corruption within the last two 
years, compared with the overall survey average of 24%. This is noteworthy when 
viewed in light of TI’s 2007 CPI rankings where Japan is listed as one of the countries 
least affected by bribery. Interestingly, however, only 2% felt that corruption was 
prevalent in their sector, suggesting that ‘Japanese companies are encountering 
substantially more corruption in their overseas operations’30. This raises questions 
about the type of operations and their locations leading to these much higher 
experiences of corruption and the degree of congruence with the TI findings (which, 
as discussed, have been subject to some criticism). Japanese companies also tended to 
feel that local enforcement was strong, compared with the respondents from other 
countries which again raises questions about the local conditions leading to these 
perceptions. Simmons & Simmons also analysed corruption levels by country and 
found Hong Kong to be the worst affected country.  
 
The findings also suggest different approaches and attitudes with respect to anti-
corruption strategies and whilst some findings indicate that the US leads with respect 
to anti-corruption policies and procedures this is by no means clear cut. Japan and the 
UK were found to lead reporting levels for ‘corporate responsibility’. Despite 
including a large number of G250 companies, the USA was not found to have 
experienced an increase in reporting despite overall reporting levels being relatively 
low (35%).  The country specific findings suggest that while the national legal 
frameworks play a key role in combating corruption there may be other factors, 
stakeholders and non-mandatory controls which are equally or more important. For 
example, KPMG (2005)31 suggests that in Asian countries award schemes may offer a 
significant stimulus because of the cultural importance of public recognition while 
Japan and France placed greater importance on national regulations as a tool for 
                                                 
30 Ernst & Young, p5. 
31 International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting. 
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determining the content of CR reports. Though the Ethical investment Research 
Services (EIRIS)32 found the Netherlands to be one of the leading countries with 
respect to adoption of anti-corruption policies, KPMG found that it has experienced a 
'noticeable increase' in the proportion of businesses losing out due to corruption, 
raising questions about the value and scope of these policies and the other factors 
which may be impacting corruption levels.  
3.3 Awareness and Understanding of Corruption and Anti-Corruption 
Instruments 
 
The survey findings suggest that at least half of businesses have little or no awareness 
of key legislation and that there is a need to improve levels of awareness and 
understanding of terms and concepts surrounding corruption and of anti-corruption 
legislation. 
 
KPMG (2007) found a lack of awareness of anti-corruption legislation amongst 
companies. Forty-six percent of respondents conducting business in the US said either 
that they were not subject to the FCPA or did not know whether they were subject to 
it. In the UK forty-three percent knew 'just a little' about Anti Terrorism Crime and 
Security Act, 2001 (ATCSA) and 30% had 'heard or knew nothing about it' or had 
never heard of it.33 Though 81% of respondents stated that they were aware that UK 
citizens or companies abroad can be prosecuted under ATCSA, 73% stated that they 
knew little or nothing else about the Act itself. More recently, Ernst and Young 
reported that  more than two-thirds of respondents had never heard of or knew nothing 
about the FCPA, including 56% of respondents from companies which were US SEC 
(Securities & Exchange Commission) registered. Simmons & Simmons found that 
approximately half of the companies surveyed admitted to being ‘totally ignorant’ of 
their country's legislation governing bribes paid abroad; the incidence was highest for 
Brazil (70%) and lowest in the Netherlands (32%).34 The report also found that in 
some cases, awareness levels appear to have declined since the 2002 survey. In 
                                                 
32 Corporate Codes of Business Ethics: An International Survey of Bribery and Ethical Standards in 
Companies. 
33 Twenty four percent and 6% respectively. Twenty-eight percent of respondents said they know 'a 
great deal' or a 'fair amount' about the ATCSA (7% and 21% respectively). 
34 A further 18% of respondent companies had only a 'vague awareness' of this legislation. 
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relation to SMEs specifically, ACCA found that 51% of respondents believed that 
SMEs were not aware that UK law enables UK courts to hear cases of bribery and 
corruption even where the acts complained of are committed abroad. 
 
The CIOB and ACCA looked also at awareness levels related to concepts and 
practices surrounding corruption. The CIOB suggests that the differing perceptions of 
the extent of corruption within particular practices may highlight 'shades of grey' 
within respondents understanding and perception of bribery and corruption in so far as 
certain practices may be tolerated or accepted to the extent that they are not regarded 
as corrupt.35 Similarly, the ACCA considered that its findings, including that most 
respondents believed that the SME community does not understand the legal 
definition of bribery and corruption, suggest ‘a fundamental problem of uncertainty 
shared by many SMEs about what an act of bribery or corruption amounts to’.36   
3.4 Perceptions of Anti-Corruption Instruments and Strategies 
 
In addition to general levels of awareness related to corruption, stakeholder 
experiences and perceptions of different legislative or other instruments and strategies 
will affect levels of compliance and the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. 
 
PwC (2008) found that 52% of respondents responded ‘1’ and 30% responded ‘2’ in 
response to the statement ‘strengthening anti-corruption measures globally would 
benefit my company’.37 When asked how effective are industry-led global anti-
corruption programmes currently, only 7% felt they were ‘very effective’38 though 
more encouragingly, 22% of respondents felt such programmes would be ‘very 
effective’ in five years time. The reasons for this anticipated increase in effectiveness 
are not explored however. Concerning more specific measures, the proportion of 
                                                 
35 The CIOB notes that open-ended responses support this view. For example, it was reported that 
many respondents felt that practices such as cover pricing were not corrupt because they are part of the 
way the industry operates. A common theme also was the prevalence of non-cash incentives to gain 
advantage but the point where a gift becomes a bribe was not clear.  
36 Respondents were asked whether SMEs would be able to make the distinction between certain 
borderline issues within corruption, such as between bribery and corruption and the provision of 
corporate hospitality. Responses indicated that for each of these issues, 45-50% of respondents 
considered that SMEs would be able to make the distinction and 57% believed that the SME 
community does not understand the legal definition of bribery and corruption. 
37 Rating scale as before (1-5). 
38 Forty-six percent of respondents felt they were ‘somewhat effective and 34% thought they were ‘not 
effective’. 
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respondents in the Simmons & Simmons survey agreeing that the FCPA and similar 
legislation passed by other OECD countries are effective tools in helping corporations 
to avoid corrupt situations was relatively high overall but varied according to country: 
US 80%, UK 72%, Brazil 68%, the Netherlands 56%, Germany 52%, France 48% and 
Hong Kong 42%. These are of course perceptions and may vary from the actual 
impact of such legislation on the incidence of corruption – correlative data will be 
useful in this context.  
 
The need for implementation and enforcement to accompany legislative measures was 
highlighted by Simmons & Simmons who found that a majority of respondents 
thought that companies from their country sought to circumvent anti-bribery 
legislation through the use of intermediaries and 'emphasised the importance of 
putting anti-corruption legislation into practice as well as passing it into law'. 
Implementation issues were also highlighted in the KPMG survey in which 80% of 
respondents 'agreed that the [ATCSA] was a laudable attempt to put an end to unfair 
practices' but which found that 58% 'agreed that the Act ignores that fact that, in many 
countries, bribery is ‘simply the way business is done’ '.  This again indicates that 
acceptance or tolerance of corrupt practices remains an obstacle to combating 
corruption. Half of respondents agreed that difficulties in collecting evidence relating 
to bribery and corruption mean that the UK ATCSA is unlikely to be effective though 
there are no further details as to the nature of the difficulties referred. These findings 
suggest that there may be a gap in support for legislation in principle and the belief 
that it will in fact lead to a reduction in corrupt practices. Despite these apparent 
limitations in respect of implementation and enforcement, the findings of Ernst & 
Young appear a little more positive; 40% of all respondents considered that bribery 
and corruption regulation is enforced ‘extremely strongly’ or ‘very strongly’, with a 
further 30% considering enforcement to be ‘fairly’ strong. It is noted that ‘this figure 
is surprisingly consistent across economic sectors and across different job functions. It 
holds for most regions of the world, rising to 60% for North America and Japan’.39  
 
The surveys also provide some indication of business attitudes towards different 
regulatory approaches but the findings are not always congruent. The ACCA asked 
                                                 
39 Ernst & Young (2008), p6. 
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how effective the different approaches listed could be in helping SMEs to reduce the 
incidence of bribery and corruption.40 By some margin, high profile cases of 
prosecution were considered to be the most effective, followed by guidance from 
professional and trade associations. The least effective approach was considered to be 
an ethical code to which businesses could publicly sign, followed by the appointment 
of an auditor. However, PwC (2008) found that respondents to their survey tended to 
favour internal, company based strategies and were not in favour of strong regulation 
by government or other external parties.41 Respondents also felt that internal measures 
and guidance were the most effective approach to minimising corruption at a 
company. Only 7% felt that aggressive enforcement by regulatory agencies would be 
most effective, 6% considered additional external government regulation/oversight 
was most effective and 4% felt that collaborating in industry or NGO initiatives was 
most effective. The faith in the effectiveness of internal programmes should be 
viewed in light of the finding that 57% of respondents believed that the ‘severity of 
potential government enforcement action in regards to a corrupt act would be reduced 
if a strong anti-corruption programme is in place at a company’. This would clearly 
increase the value and in this respect effectiveness of an internal programme (and is 
somewhat paradoxical to the views on the limited relevance of government regulation 
and enforcement).  
 
There is clearly some variance in attitudes concerning the approaches which are most 
favoured or perceived to be most effective but the surveys do not give an 
understanding of the dimensions of this. The findings indicate that neither a strongly 
mandatory or punitive nor a strongly voluntary or compliance based approach is 
supported, for instance the two options considered most effective and the two 
considered least effective in the ACCA survey are quite different in nature.42   
                                                 
40 These were: the appointment of an auditor; an ethical code to which businesses could publicly sign 
up; laws granting whistle-blowing rights to businesses in respect of bribery and corruption they are 
confronted with; guidance from professional and trade associations; high profile cases of prosecution. 
These were ranked on a scale of 1 (greatest) to 5 (least). 
41 The responsibility for preventing corruption at companies was seen to fall primarily on senior 
management (40%) and all staff members (‘responsible for their own high ethical standards’, 33%). Of 
other stakeholders listed, only 2% felt that responsibility lay primarily with Government/government 
agencies and 2% that it lay primarily with external auditors. 
42 Ernst and Young also found that punitive and financial impacts were perceived in such a way. Their 
survey investigated the impacts which would be considered most significant in the event of an 
allegation of bribery or corrupt business practices made against the company. Fines and penalties were 
considered the most significant (45%, this figure was higher for the US, UK, Japan and China/Hong 
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3.5 Internal Procedures and Policies 
 
The actions and policies adopted by businesses act as an indicator not only of the 
impact and compliance levels of 'external' instruments but also of the attitudes of 
businesses towards combating corruption and the types of approach which may be 
most conducive to achieving this. The reports explore the extent to which business 
have adopted anti-corruption policies or strategies and/or the measures and procedures 
that have been applied in practice in order to combat corruption and achieve 
compliance with internal policies or other instruments. 
 
Reviewing the extent to which ethics codes had been adopted by the surveyed 
companies and how comprehensive these were, EIRIS found though that 61% of all 
high risk companies had an explicit policy against bribery, some of the highest risk 
sectors (oil and gas and aerospace and defence) were  much less likely to have 
adopted a policy; 'just under 24% appear to have declared policies [covering all the 
listed criteria]...Given the pressures to pay bribes which exist in these sectors, these 
figures seem low.' The UK and the Netherlands were found to be leading the way on a 
country specific basis and larger companies were also more likely to have adopted 
polices.43  
 
PwC (2007)44 found the number of companies which had both compliance and ethics 
programmes in place with respect to corruption and bribery was limited (8%) and was 
lower than the number who had such programmes in place for fraud in overall terms 
(36%), suggesting that even in this limited sphere, internal measures related to 
corruption may be overlooked. Focusing specifically on corruption PwC (2008) 
reported that ‘almost 80% of respondents indicate that their company has some type 
of anti-corruption programme. Yet it is troubling that only 22% say they are very 
                                                                                                                                            
Kong), followed by ‘blocked from markets’ (44%); ‘inability to grow or expand business (35%); 
‘increased cost of compliance (29%); ‘shareholder/competitor litigation’ (29%) and ‘jail time for 
employees (21%).  
43 Companies in the Netherlands had the most developed policies, 'with over 86% having meaningful 
ethical codes, and almost 73% having ‘advanced’ policies' and 'over 78% of UK larger cap companies 
have meaningful ethical codes, although this figure drops to around 31% once the sample is extended 
to cover all medium and smaller cap companies (the FTSE all-share index)'. The US, Australia, New 
Zealand, and the Nordic countries were also found to have 'relatively high percentages of their 
companies having ethical codes'. 
44 Economic Crime: People, Culture and Controls. 
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confident it identifies and mitigates the risk of corruption’.45  Similarly, the KPMG 
survey on Corporate Responsibility reporting noted that of the 18% of companies that 
include policies for bribery and corruption, ‘few elaborate on how such commitments 
are put into practice’46. Thus even where companies do have a programme in place, 
its validity is questionable in many cases. KPMG (2007) indicated similar limitations 
finding that 65% of companies who conduct business in the US either do not know 
whether they have a US FCPA compliance program or say they do not have such a 
program. Of the respondents who were aware that UK citizens and companies abroad 
can be prosecuted (see above), 31% said they had taken no action to communicate the 
ATCSA to their employees. Half of these respondents cited the fact that they 'did not 
think it was relevant to their business' as the reason for this. 
 
Simmons & Simmons found relatively high rates of adoption for specific internal 
measures, particularly with respect to the US. The US companies were most likely to 
have reviewed their own integrity procedures within the last three years 'in light of 
increased international focus on corruption' (74%)47  and were more likely than 'their 
international counter-parts' to have anti-corruption training programmes. 
Unsurprisingly (given the reforms associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) the 
practice of requiring senior officers to sign formal annual statements confirming that 
they have abided by anti-corruption laws was considered to be less prevalent in other 
countries but on a sectoral basis, oil, gas & mining companies were most likely to 
follow this practice as were larger companies. There was a reported increase (since 
2002) in the number of companies that have introduced confidential reporting 
hotlines: again, the US led the way along with the UK (both at 42% of companies).48 
Similarly, formal processes for assessing intermediaries were considered to be 
                                                 
45 PwC (2008), p13. A further 52% say they are somewhat confident but, it is commented, this groups 
confidence may not be justified as only 18% of this group believe their company considers the risk of 
corruption when making significant business decisions. 
46 p19.   
47 The figure for the UK was 64% and Brazilian companies were least likely to have reviewed their 
procedures (12%). Although Brazil is not an OECD country it has signed the OECD Convention. It was 
considered that the US position may reflect tighter enforcement of the US FCPA combined with the 
impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, suggesting that these domestic legislative instruments are 
considered to have made an impact.  
48 The importance of whistle-blowing hotlines was also emphasised in the KPMG report which noted 
that one of its earlier surveys had found that 50% of fraudulent or corrupt activity was discovered by 
such means. 
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becoming more common, particularly in the US (79%).49  The adoption by companies 
of procedures to vet the integrity of commercial partners and suppliers was, however, 
most common in the UK (84%), followed by the Netherlands and the US (each at 
70%).50  
 
Accounting and auditing measures are an important aspect of anti-corruption 
strategies (see section 2.3). Ernst & Young comment that ‘expectations of the internal 
audit function have never been greater’,51 a view also highlighted in the PwC (2008) 
survey in which 69% of respondents agreed that ‘internal auditors in your industry are 
performing procedures that are likely to detect instances of corruption’. The internal 
audit may often be relied upon for the detection of corrupt practices and has 
particularly been linked with the detection of fraud. This means that the role and 
competencies of audit personnel becomes extremely important; Ernst & Young found 
that 30% of respondents strongly agreed that internal auditors ‘have a sufficiently 
detailed understanding of the risks and indicators to detect bribery and corrupt 
business practices’. Twenty six percent of respondents felt that the internal audit is 
extremely or very successful in detecting bribery or corrupt practices and a further 
40% felt that it was ‘fairly’ successful. Though there was some variance between 
countries, these data indicate some limitations in terms of the capacity of internal 
audit measures in detecting and combating corruption.52  
 
3.6 Stakeholder Roles 
 
As indicated, the actual or potential involvement of different stakeholders in relation 
to business efforts to combat corruption was a theme which emerged throughout the 
                                                 
49 They were least common in France at 35%. 
50 The findings of PwC (2007) refer to fraud overall (encompassing corruption and bribery) but it is 
noteworthy that this survey found that 41% of frauds were discovered by ‘chance’, an increase of seven 
percentage points from the previous two years. The report also observes ‘the consistently high response 
rates from companies showing that the initial means of detection is via a whistle-blowing hotline (81% 
cases) or tip-off (from an internal source in 21% of cases and an external source in 14%). It is our view 
that this results from employees both being encouraged and facilitated…to do the right thing”. In cases 
in which a whistle-blowing system was rated as ‘effective’, it is noted, this increased the rate of 
detection to 14%. Internal auditing was also important and accounted for 19% of detections overall. 
See pp 10-11. 
51 Ernst & Young (2008), p11. 
52 Seven percent of those interviewed in Latin America and 8% in Japan stated that the internal audit 
had not been successful compared with 40% of professionals from companies in Central and eastern 
Europe who thought poorly of this function.  Ibid, p12. 
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surveys, though none provides a thorough understanding of which stakeholders are 
involved and in what capacity.53 The mixed views related to the role played by 
internal auditors, for instance, has been mentioned above but a broad range of 
stakeholders may play a role in influencing business attitudes and practices with 
respect to corruption. Whilst in some instances the role of government was given a 
low priority (see PwC 2008), in others there appears to be a need and/or desire for 
government to increase its efforts with respect to corruption (see CIOB). In the same 
context, sixty-nine percent of respondents thought that the UK construction industry 
itself was not doing enough to combat corruption.54) 
 
Respondents in the ACCA survey felt that SMEs would be most likely to turn to their 
lawyer (42%) or accountant (29%) for advice about bribery or corruption issues. More 
than 59% agreed that SMEs would welcome advice from their accountants in relation 
to the adoption of policies and procedures for dealing with cases of corruption.55 As 
discussed by ACCA, the presence of client confidentiality or the presence of an 
established relationship based on the provision of other services may be relevant here. 
The issues related to possible conflict of interest and the provision of accounting and 
auditing services can be seen to remain a relevant concern in this context.  The 
findings also highlight the importance of identifying stakeholder roles and 
expectations; if, for example, lawyers are not aware that they are seen as a key source 
of advice in this respect then it may be fair to expect that they might not be 
sufficiently placed to provide such advice. These findings were mirrored to some 
extent by the KPMG survey regarding sources of information used for understanding 
foreign business practices; 75% of respondents said they would use lawyers or outside 
counsel and 59% would use accountants.56 57 Eleven percent of respondents believed 
                                                 
53 The term 'stakeholder' is being used broadly to include, for example, businesses, governments, 
international bodies, NGOs at all levels, professional and industry bodies or organisations and 
individual members of society. 
54 The CIOB recommended that 'clear codes of ethical conduct should be communicated to the industry 
and implemented at all levels... Industry bodies should unite in a common initiative to provide 
guidelines and advice to professionals on how to deal with these issues.'  
55 pp 12-13. 
56 Eight percent responded 'don't know’, 22% responded 'other', 17% would use private investigators 
and 42% would use British embassies or consulates. The findings were discussed with respect to the 
need for businesses to take informed decisions about who they are doing business with. 
57 Respondents in the PwC (2008) survey identified compliance officers, external auditors and general 
counsel/lawyers as well as internal management, staff and regulatory agents (discussed above) but in 
that survey these stakeholders were less significant (4%, 2% and 2% respectively). However, this may 
be related to the difference in questions. The PwC survey asked who respondents felt was primarily 
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that SMEs would not turn to anyone for advice, indicating a gap which could 
contribute to reduced levels of awareness and compliance.  
 
3.7 CSR and Corruption 
 
Since corruption has been increasingly identified as part of the broader CSR agenda 
(see Section 1 above) it is relevant to consider some of the related findings in this 
area. The Institute of Directors (IoD)58 found mixed levels of awareness in relation to 
particular CSR instruments and the findings give very little indication of patterns 
related to awareness levels, though in overall terms the initiatives of the UK 
Government as well guidelines of the Association of British Insurers were most 
frequently recognised.59 The majority of respondents to the IoD survey were SMEs  
(these make up the majority of its membership) and in some cases awareness levels 
varied according to sector (this is logical given that certain industries may be subject 
to statutory requirements or other pressures that other industries are not, for example, 
with respect to environmental controls). At this stage the reasons for these varying 
and often low levels of recognition are not understood but it can be seen that the issue 
of awareness may be significant in this context as well as with respect to specific anti-
corruption instruments. KPMG reviewed the international standards and codes 
referred to in companies’ CG reports and their findings correlate with the IoD’s to 
some extent. It was noted that most of the reports refer to standards established by the 
UN (including the International Labour Organisation, UN Declaration on Human 
Rights and the UNGC). The UNGC was identified in 35% of reports but OECD’s 
GME was identified in only 11% of reports, with others referred to less frequently. It 
is perhaps not surprising, however, that company reports do not refer to influential 
instruments expressly.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
responsible for preventing corruption in companies.  This is also not to rule out the importance of 
company staff members and senior management as important stakeholders in their own right. 
58 Corporate Social Responsibility: IoD Member Opinion Survey. 
59 Awareness levels were: for the Investors in People Initiative, 95%, EU Eco Management and Audit 
(EMAS) 29%, ISO 14001, 6%; the ‘Making a Corporate Commitment Campaign’ – 7%, ABI 
Guidelines on Social Responsibility, 48%; the EU eco-label, 40%; the UN Global Compact, 21%;  the 
DEFRA and DTI Guidelines on Environmental Reporting 39%, the Business Impact Task Force or 
their report ‘Winning with Integrity’, 12%; the Global Reporting Initiative, 13%, Social Accountability 
8000, 11%, the Ethical Trading Initiative, 26%. 
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KPMG found the level of company reporting on corporate responsibility (CR) to be 
increasing: the percentage of firms publishing a separate CR report increased from 
45% in (2002) to 52% for G250 firms and from 23% to 33% for N100 firms though, 
when viewed on a country basis, the picture is uneven.60 The report notes that the 
figures support, to some extent, the assumption that reporting is led by multinational 
companies. However, the US, which had the largest number of G250 companies, did 
not see an increase in CR reporting. An increase in reporting levels was seen in nearly 
all sectors, though the greatest increase occurred in the financial sector.61 The survey 
also indicated that the scope of reports has broadened, from an initial focus on 
environmental health and safety to sustainability, reflecting the expanded remit of the 
CSR agenda. Again, there is a need to how, if at all, they mirror the situation in the 
case of corruption.  
 
KPMG (2005) also identified a range of drivers associated with CR reporting, the 
most important of which fell within the category of economic considerations62 (for 
74% of respondents) followed by ethical considerations (53%). The report suggests 
also that the issue of governance, as an aspect of CR reporting, is driven by regulatory 
developments such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as indicated by the fact that 61% of 
reports included a section on corporate governance. A key matter here is to 
understand whether the same drivers apply to the different components of CSR, 
including corruption, and to identify which drivers are relevant to business practices 
regarding these components. 
 
With respect to stakeholder roles in CSR, the IoD survey asked respondents ‘which of 
the following do you think should be involved in monitoring the social and/or 
environmental impact of business?’ The highest ranking stakeholder was ‘the 
government’ (88%), followed by ‘organisations that represent your business’ (84%) 
and ‘employees’ (82%). Other stakeholders supported in the majority of cases were 
                                                 
60 For N100 companies reporting levels are 80% and 71% for Japan and the UK respectively, but this is 
followed by a substantial drop with the third country, Canada, having reporting levels of 41%. The 
average excluding the two countries with the highest levels of reporting and the two countries with the 
lowest levels of reporting in 26%. The levels by which reporting has increased also vary according to 
country. 
61 Raising questions about the possible positive impact (on reporting levels) of instruments such as the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act. 
62 These were linked either directly or indirectly to shareholder value or market share. See pp 18-19. 
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shareholders (67%), local councils (64%), investors (excluding shareholders) (64%), 
customers (63%), and the EU (58%). It is interesting to note that non-governmental 
bodies or interest groups were ranked lowest (43%).63 These findings potentially have 
important implications with regard to the development of future anti-corruption 
efforts generally and to the possibilities for anti-corruption efforts under the CSR 
umbrella. It can be seen that there is some variance between the perceived roles of 
stakeholders in this context and with regard to corruption specifically raising 
questions about how corruption should be tackled through CSR initiatives. The 
findings again challenge the assumption that companies prefer voluntary and/or 
internalised approaches as opposed to, for example, government intervention (the 
findings do not, however, indicate what type of involvement organisations such as 
government and the EU should have). Secondly, that NGOs are the least favoured 
stakeholder with regard to monitoring has clear implications concerning the likely 
success of collaborative measures or other initiatives suggested by these 
organisations. KPMG investigated the extent of stakeholder dialogue reported by 
firms and found that more than 57% of organisations included information on 
stakeholders in their reports but only 39% of these referred to structured dialogue. 
Only 7% of reports systematically identified stakeholders and whereas 32% invite 
stakeholder feedback, only 8% report on it. Again, this suggests that business 
engagement with stakeholders may be limited. 
                                                 
63 Other listed stakeholders were suppliers (50%), the media (48%), and devolved governments (47%).  
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Section 4 
The Present Survey: Design and Implementation 
 
4.1 Survey aims and objectives 
 
The review of existing data in the previous section highlights some important themes 
which should be examined further for the purpose of developing a fuller 
understanding of the ways in which different anti-corruption strategies are perceived 
and utilised by companies. The survey reports also raise further questions about the 
reported views and experiences and the ways in which the variance in responses 
derived from different survey samples might or might not correlate. Thus, whilst the 
surveys provide an important starting point with respect to exploring company 
practices and attitudes they provide only a limited and fragmented picture of the 
issues. In addition these surveys do not extend to investigate the role played by 
NGOs, a key stakeholder group with respect to anti-corruption strategies. A more 
comprehensive understanding is needed before more confident comments on the 
impacts, gaps and limitations of the different anti-corruption strategies, and how these 
might be effectively addressed, can be made. The survey implemented by the present 
authors seeks to address this gap in research. 
 
Recognising the limitations noted above and the need to understand further issues 
related to combating corruption in international business, the present authors sought to 
examine: 
1) The levels of awareness and perceptions of companies regarding particular anti-
corruption instruments; 
2) The type of and extent to which anti-corruption practices and activities have 
been applied  by businesses and NGOs; 
3) The factors and drivers influencing the approaches and attitudes of these 
stakeholders to combating corruption; 
4) The differing roles that stakeholders play with respect to tackling corruption and 
how these might be more effectively utilised; and 
5) How, if at all, the CSR approach has been and could be applied for the purpose 
of combating corruption. 
 
 36
The traditional method of assessing the impact of specific legislation by examining 
the number of investigations and prosecutions either within a state or globally is of 
limited use in the present context since many of the legislative developments based 
upon ratification and implementation of conventions are still in their infancy. Further, 
an assessment based on a review of the prosecution figures would fail to take into 
account the multi-pronged approach to combating corruption. In these circumstances, 
the best way to assess the impact of current approaches to combating corruption is to 
approach those who are affected by the strategies and those who promote strategies 
and to obtain relevant information that will provide answers, be they negative, 
positive or ambivalent, to the questions that were listed above. 
 
4.2 Methodology  
 
The nature of the methods adopted is relevant to an understanding of not only how the 
research questions are being addressed but also the nature of the data and findings 
subsequently derived. These therefore are worthy of further explanation at this 
juncture and are considered below. 
4.2.1 The Sample Population 
 
As stated earlier (Section 1) a range of stakeholders is relevant to the study of anti-
corruption approaches. For the purposes of the present research two key stakeholder 
groups were targeted: (A) businesses and (B) NGOs. 
  
(A)  Businesses - clearly these are important stakeholders being both subject to anti-
corruption efforts and potentially contributing to the development of anti-
corruption measures through implementation of internal measures or 
involvement in voluntary initiatives.  
(B)  NGOs - these stakeholders may play an important role in combating corruption 
in international business through their involvement in the development of 
different strategies and tools, work with businesses, awareness raising 
campaigns targeting various stakeholders and involvement with international 
institutions.  
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The range of stakeholders for inclusion within each stakeholder group was large. This 
necessitated the delineation of the groups to provide a manageable sample frame. 
Businesses were targeted based on the stock exchange listings of The Times (London). 
This sample frame would enable a range of variables to be explored, for instance 
company size, geographic location, and sector. The identification of relevant NGOs 
was more complex, inevitably raising questions of interpretation of the term ‘NGO’ 
and the extent to which given organisations were relevant. Organisations undertaking 
work directly related to corruption were of course included as were some 
organisations working in the broader field of CSR, particularly where this related to 
development or governance. Various searches were carried out for the purpose of 
identifying these organisations and the final list included 162 organisations which, it 
was felt, would have an appropriate level of awareness of the relevant issues and 
would be in a position to provide meaningful inputs. Purely academic organisations 
and ‘think-tanks’ were excluded on this basis. Again, this list included organisations 
with a range of characteristics such as organisation size and level of operation, 
geographic location, and action and work types. 
 
4.2.2 Data Collection 
 
In order to pursue the research aims, a self-completion postal questionnaire was 
designed.64 Although there is a wide range of data collection methods (e.g. telephone 
interviews, face-to-face interviews, existing data sets), questionnaires had several 
advantages which made them suitable for the present study including, 
1) Cost - compared with other methods, the cost of administering questionnaires is 
relatively low, an important consideration given the availability of resources and 
the range of geographic locations of targeted stakeholders (see Bryman (2004), 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1992)); 
2) Accessibility - use of questionnaires rather than, for instance, interviews, would 
enable a greater number of target participants to be included in the survey; 
 
                                                 
64 Separate questionnaires were designed for the two target groups. 
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3) Greater levels of anonymity - this was particularly pertinent given the relatively 
sensitive nature of the subject matter (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 
(1992)); and  
4) Removal of ‘interviewer effects’- the bias introduced when the characteristics of 
the interviewer or interviewee, or the way in which the questions are delivered, 
affects the answers given (ibid). 
 
The postal questionnaire method has its limitations however. The primary limitation is 
that they usually result in lower response rates than do alternative methods.65 
Unfortunately, there is no generally accepted view on what constitutes an acceptable 
response rate but clearly the problem lies in the fact that low response rates increase 
the risk of bias and therefore limit the reliability and validity of the findings.66 
 
The commonly identified limitations associated with survey design and administration 
and guidance on how to minimise their effects were addressed in the development of 
the questionnaires and need not be discussed in detail here.67 Relevant factors 
included: 
1) Questionnaire format and structure issues such as questionnaire length, layout 
choices and instructions such as the use of branched questions; 
2) Question construction including the content of questions, type of questions used, 
question and answer formats such as the use of tick boxes, scales and matrices, 
order of questions and complexity and language issues; 
3) Presentation and design issues such as the use of visual aids including font 
effects and considerations for visually impaired or dyslexic readers; and  
4) Administration and completion effects including the use of covering letters, 
postage methods and incentives for completion. 
 
                                                 
65 In the context of surveys, the ‘response rate’ is “the percentage of respondents in the sample who 
return completed questionnaires” Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1992). 
66 Bias is increased because it is not possible to prove that those who did not participate do not differ 
from those that did participate. This will in fact almost always be the case. See Bryman; see also 
Bethlehem et al (2007); Spitzmuller et al (2007).  
67 For further on this see, for instance, Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1992); Bryman (2004); 
Dunn et al (2003); Jenkins and Dillman (1995); Zukerberg and Lee (1997); de Rada (2005); Dillman et 
al (1993); Kalton and Schuman (1982); Fowler (1993); Oppenheim (1992); Redline and Dillman 
(2001). 
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In accordance with recommended practice, a pilot survey, the focus of this Report, 
was carried out prior to the full survey. In addition to providing valuable preliminary 
data an important aim of the pilot survey was to test the survey materials; the 
questionnaire and associated documents. A feedback sheet was included with 
questionnaires to assist with this. Responses and feedback received from the pilot 
would enable difficulties to be identified and for the survey to be adapted where 
necessary, for example, by removing ambiguities in question construction. The pilot 
would also be useful, it was anticipated, in giving an indication of response levels and 
associated issues. 
 
For the purposes of the pilot survey one sector, industrials, was selected from The 
Times listings. The sampling strategy in this case was again purposeful so that a range 
of variables would be included. This sector included 81 companies, 80 of which were 
targeted.68 Given the smaller sample frame for NGOs, 10% of the list (16 
organisations) was targeted for the pilot survey. These organisations were selected 
randomly from the list along with two further organisations with which the authors 
had made contact and this again was intended to allow for variety in the pilot survey 
participants.  
4.2.3 Methodological Issues Arising from the Pilot Survey  
Feedback  
 
Although response levels were limited (see below) some useful feedback was 
obtained. Table IV summarises the feedback received and how it was addressed 
(where relevant). 
 
Table IV: Feedback 
 Company: 
yes 
Company: 
no 
NGO: 
yes 
NGO: 
no 
Were you happy with the length of time taken to 
complete the survey? 
 I   
Were the questions easy to understand? I    
Were you happy with the layout and structure of 
the survey? 
I    
Was the survey easy to read? I    
Did we omit any important issues  I   
Additional questions suggested:     None 
Other comments:                            None 
                                                 
68 No details were found for one company, following several searches. 
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 Response Rates 
 
Although low response levels were identified as the key limitation of questionnaires 
the level of responses actually received, particularly from businesses, was lower than 
desirable. By the stated deadline only four companies had responded and only two of 
these had completed the questionnaire. The recommended technique of sending out 
follow-up letters raised the total number of responses to ten. Of these, the ‘true’ 
response rate, based on questionnaire completion was 5% (four companies). Although 
the response rate of NGOs was slightly higher than that of businesses (16.7% - all 
three responding participants completed the questionnaire), this still represents a 
relatively low response rate. Research indicates that overall, levels of participation in 
surveys are declining over time (de Leeuw, and de Heer (2001), Bryman (2004), 
Bethlehem, Cobben and Schouten (2007), and Inaba: 2007). Since non-response was a 
key issue arising from the pilot survey it is worthy of further discussion at this stage. 
This more detailed discussion highlights a number of theoretical and practical issues 
arising for empirical legal investigation of this nature. 
 
Dillman et al (2001) summarise the main ways which in which unit non-response (in 
which the sample unit - in this case the business or organisation - fails to respond) 
occurs in postal surveys. These are ‘no request’, for instance, where the questionnaire 
is not delivered; ‘refusal’, as where the questionnaire is read but ignored and 
‘incapacity’ for example, arising from illiteracy (see also Lynn and Clarke (2002)). 
Where no response is received it is impossible to be certain why this has occurred. In 
the present case it is possible that ‘no request’ occurred for instance as a result of non-
delivery arising from the postal system or due to organisations having changed their 
contact details, or ceasing to trade. It seems unlikely that this would account for the 
majority of instances, in which case ‘refusal’ may be the more likely position.  
 
It is important to consider the matter of non-response in the context of the type of 
survey being carried out. Existing research suggests that surveys targeting 
organisations, as in the present case, achieve ‘substantially’ lower response rates than 
surveys of individuals (Hager (2003)).69 Specific hurdles may limit response rates in 
                                                 
69 Cycota and Harrison found in their meta-analysis of executive non-response, that the mean response 
rate was 34%, reducing to 32% when adjusted to remove surveys that had used prior screening. With 
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such surveys, for example, company policy may preclude survey participation or the 
participant may be subject to confidentiality rules. For small organisations, resource 
constraints may also be influential (Hager (2003), Bartholemew and Smith (2006), 
Cycota and Harrison (2006)). It has also been suggested that an increase in the 
number of survey requests being received may be linked with declining response rates 
amongst company executives (Cycota and Harrison).  
 
The nature of the contact person or individual respondent might also be relevant. In 
the present case questionnaires were directed to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) 
where possible, or other senior officers such as Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) or the 
Company Secretary. NGO questionnaires were targeted at similarly senior staff 
members such as the Director. There were good reasons for targeting these 
individuals, particularly since they should have a detailed awareness of the 
organisation’s policies and activities and/or be in a position to direct the questionnaire 
to the appropriate contact person as well as potentially playing a role in implementing 
and or enforcing corporate governance rules as discussed in Section 1. However, it 
has been suggested that it is particularly difficult to get responses from CEOs 
(Bartholomew and Smith (2006)).70  
 
Questionnaire design factors are also associated with unit non-response and as 
indicated in 2.2 above a number of steps were taken to minimise the impact of these 
on response levels. However, one design factor which may be impacting response 
levels is the length of the survey; ‘long’ surveys (an undefined concept) have been 
associated with lower response rates, although findings on this matter are mixed (see, 
                                                                                                                                            
respect to small firms, a review by Bartholomew and Smith found an average response rate of 27% and 
Hager et al found that in some cases response levels of 15% were considered accepted in organisational 
surveys.  
70 In addition, Cycota and Harrison found that executives may have particular characteristics which will 
influence appropriate survey techniques and levels of non response The authors also found that of a 
range of factors traditionally considered to influence response rates – topic salience; specific 
manipulations of the social exchange (inclusion of an incentive, advance notice to the executive, 
follow-up contact and personalisation of the survey and cover letter); prior consent screening and 
sponsorship – topic salience was the only contributor to response rate variation across the studies. 
Although this suggests that in many cases the time and effort involved in employing these techniques 
may not be worth the additional resources required a number of other authors support the use of such 
techniques. In the present case the adoption of some follow-up attempts and identification of 
sponsorship were considered worthwhile according to a cost-benefit analysis but other techniques, such 
as resending questionnaires by post and the use of incentives, were not considered worthwhile on that 
basis. 
 
 42
for instance, Hager et al (2003) and Marcus et al (2007)). In the present case the 
questionnaire might be considered ‘long’ but the feedback received was by no means 
compelling in this respect and generally did not identify other difficulties associated 
with questionnaire design.  
 
It has also been suggested that identifying sponsorship information improves response 
rates because it helps to convince the respondent of the survey’s legitimacy and may 
imply sanctions for failing to reply (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1992)). This 
information was therefore included in the covering letter and other survey 
documentation. Despite this, overall responses rates were low. An interesting possible 
dynamic is the association of the survey request with an ‘in-group’ or an ‘out-group’, 
with the former more likely to elicit participation. This can be considered in light of 
the theoretical perspectives presented by Johnson et al (2003) based on an 
examination of the ways in which, at the country level, different cultural interactions 
and dimensions, including such group status, may influence survey propensity, read 
together with some of the existing surveys on corruption. It can be seen from Table III 
that the majority of surveys were undertaken by bodies which are strongly associated 
with a particular industry or profession, such as the Association of Chartered and 
Certified Accountants (ACCA) or by large auditing or business services companies 
such as KPMG. These surveys involved high numbers of respondents, with one 
reporting a response rate of 98%. The survey with the smallest number of participants 
(though also with a smaller sample frame) was carried out by CREM,71 a different 
type of organisation.72 A note of caution must be added since these surveys only 
indicate the overall number of participants, rather than the response rate. A possibility 
however is that bodies such as ACCA and KPMG are seen as 'in-groups' either 
because they provide assistance or professional services to the respondents or because 
respondents are members of the body. By contrast an academic body such as a 
university or research council, as in the present case, might be seen as an out-group. 
The same principles might also apply to NGOs. The targeted stakeholder may see 
themselves as a different and separate type of organisation from a university or 
                                                 
71 Corporate Responsibility in India: Policy and Practices of Dutch Companies. 
72 CREM (Consultancy and Research for Environmental Management)  is a company specialising in 
sustainable development in the Netherlands through “conducting research, consulting and performing 
process management for international organisations, governmental bodies, multinational companies, 
non-governmental organisations and certifying bodies”. See http://www.crem.nl/.  
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research council and be less willing to be involved in research conducted by an 
organisation that is not an 'in-group' in this respect.  
 
Several other issues have been identified as limiting response rates and may be 
relevant in the present case. For instance, it is perhaps fair to assume that companies, 
if not NGOs, would perceive corruption to be a sensitive topic since engaging in 
corrupt practices, might be illegal and/or might be viewed as immoral, as might 
holding accepting views of such practices. Studies on sensitive topics tend to achieve 
lower response rates because respondents may be reluctant to divulge information 
about issues perceived to be too personal or potentially threatening (Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias (1992), Afzar and Murrell (2005) with respect to reticence 
on the part of participants when reporting sensitive acts related to corruption and 
Jensen et al (2007) regarding the application by firms of non-response and false-
response mechanisms when expressing beliefs about corruption in politically 
repressive countries). Topic saliency might also be relevant: topics which are 
considered by the participant to be interesting or highly relevant tend to achieve 
higher response rates (Bryman (2004); Cycyota and Harrison (2006); Lynn and Clarke 
(2002); Marcus et al (2007)). The possibility that organisations consider corruption to 
be of ‘low saliency’ would have serious implications for future anti-corruption 
developments. 
 
In addition to these methodological perspectives it is also interesting to reflect upon 
the reasons actually given for non-response. Existing surveys on corruption (see Table 
III) indicate relatively high numbers of participants. It should be emphasised however, 
that in most cases the relevant reports do not indicate the response rate and it cannot 
be assumed that much higher response rates were achieved in all cases. The high 
numbers of participants in those surveys do raise questions about whether companies 
might choose to engage with research into corruption only where they deem the 
reporting organisation to be aligned with their own interest. Of the six companies 
which responded but did not participate one company cited resource constraints, two 
companies noted that they only participate in surveys which are of the 'utmost 
importance' or are of 'direct relevance' to the firm and the remaining three companies 
specified that company policy precluded their participation. These points raise 
questions about the extent to which companies are really committed to combating 
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corruption since the pilot data suggests an unwillingness to discuss company views on 
anti-corruption strategies. The matter of non-response might also relate to the issue of 
anti-corruption motivations and drivers, raising questions about whether the adoption 
of anti-corruption policies and practices is tied principally to factors such as the desire 
to protect corporate or brand reputation and to perceived financial benefits and could 
potentially form an aspect of corporate ‘blue-washing’. Additional survey data should 
shed further light on these possibilities. An interesting recent development has been 
the publication of the Woolf Committee Report, Business ethics, global companies 
and the defence industry; ethical business conduct in BAE Systems plc– the way 
forward (2008). The report highlights the importance of strengthening company anti-
corruption programmes including for the purpose of protecting corporate reputation 
and it will be interesting to see whether this publication prompts higher response rates 
for the rest of the survey. 
 
Although the response rate of NGOs was slightly higher than that of businesses, the 
relatively low level also raises questions about the ways in which these organisations 
are actively engaged in this field as opposed to simply expressing support or 
commitment to it.  
 
It is too early to draw conclusions as to the final response levels but it is interesting to 
consider that at a time when the prominence of anti-corruption efforts is increasing a 
large majority of targeted organisations have not engaged in this opportunity to share 
their views and experiences of existing strategies. The issue of non-response rate is, 
however, one which will be carried forward to the rest of the survey. One possibility 
may be to send additional follow-up letters – it is not uncommon to adopt several 
follow-up measures but this of course has resource implications and as indicated, may 
not be worthwhile in cost benefit terms. The feedback form will be used for further 
phases of the survey and may provide further insights. The possibility of sending out a 
shortened version of the questionnaire is also being considered though this again has 
methodological implications – there would be issues with comparing data from the 
two different questionnaires even if specific questions remained the same. 
Understanding who has not responded and why they have not responded (i.e. the 
differences between responding and non responding organisations) is an extremely 
complex matter but may be explored later through further analysis of the non-
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responding organisations. Understanding these relevant factors might shed some 
further light on the subject. As noted by Rogelberg and Stanton (2007:195)  
 
“In the absence of good information about presence, magnitude and direction 
of nonresponse bias, ignoring the results of a study with 10% response rate - 
particularly if the research question explores a new and previously 
unaddressed issue - is just as foolish as assuming that one with a response rate 
of 80% is unassailable.”
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Section 5 
Pilot Survey Findings 
 
The present authors’ pilot survey, as indicated, covered both companies and NGOs 
and both sets of findings are presented below. 
5.1 Company Responses 
5.1.1 Company Characteristics 
 
The characteristics of the four responding companies varied (see Table V below). 
Two were based in the UK, one in the US and one in the British Virgin Islands, with 
the non-UK based companies identified as being listed on the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM) exchange. No listings on stock exchanges of other countries were 
reported. One of the UK based companies identified itself as operating only within the 
UK while the others reported operating in a range of countries worldwide. This UK 
based company therefore potentially has a different experience from other responding 
companies. 
 
Table V: Characteristics of Company Respondents 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. Head office 
Stock exchange 
listings Countries of operation 
70 USA UK AIM US, INDIA, MEXICO 
                                               
55 UK UK  
WORLDWIDE EXCEPT 
CHINA, JAPAN, CANADA 
3 UK UK UK 
35 BVI UK AIM BVI, CHINA, EUROPE, HK 
 
5.1.2 Perceived Levels of Corruption 
The pilot survey undertaken by the present authors also asked participants to indicate 
the levels of corruption which they felt were present (i) within their organisation and 
(ii) in the sector which they operate in. Interestingly, the respondents reported the 
perceived level of corruption existing within their own organisation to be very low, 
scored as 1 or 2 on a scale of 1 – 10, with 10 being entirely corrupt. These findings 
vary to some extent with those of the surveys discussed in Section one. As noted, in 
those surveys companies generally indicated that levels of corruption and/or 
experiences of particular corrupt practices were high. There is again a possibility of 
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response bias arising in the present case because of the direct nature of the questions 
(compared with questions which frame the issue in terms of companies losing out 
because of corruption, for instance).  Similarly, this difference raises the issue of 
whether company responses vary depending on the type of body conducting the 
research. 
 
The perception of the level of corruption existing within the industry as a whole was 
only marginally higher – ranked as ‘2’ by two respondents and ‘5’ by one (no. 55).73 
It may be noted that KPMG (2007) also found that companies reported lower than 
average levels of corruption within their industry. It may also be that companies are 
unwilling to reveal the extent of corruption that exists or simply might not be aware of 
it. The likelihood of these possibilities is high if there is a tolerance towards or 
acceptance of certain corrupt practices. A comparison of these responses with data 
collected in later phases of the survey is therefore necessary to explore the likely 
reasons behind these findings.  It will be interesting to compare these findings by 
sector based on the full survey data. It is really too early to speculate about the 
influence of geographic locations except to note that there appears to be a distinction 
between the responses of those companies based in the UK (3 and 55) compared with 
those based elsewhere (70 and 35). Those based in the UK appear to have more 
limited awareness of anti-corruption instruments and to have taken more limited steps 
with respect to compliance and enforcement, despite the fact that they appear to 
operate in locations with perhaps a higher risk of exposure to corruption. 
5.1.3 Influences on Company Behaviour 
 
There is similar division between the companies in respect of their perceptions of the 
influence of different sources on their company behaviour.74 Whereas companies 70 
and 35 ranked all the sources listed, on several occasions companies 55 and 3 either 
did not respond or indicated that they ‘don’t know or are not aware of the source’. 
                                                 
73 Company 3 (operating only in the UK) replied ‘don’t know’. 
74 The sources listed were: (1) International Law (e.g. agreements or convention), (2) industry specific 
code or initiatives, (3) general voluntary initiatives (voluntary  codes, guidelines, coalitions), (4) 
national laws in the main country of operation, (5) national laws in other countries of operation (6) 
national government policies, (7) influence of NGOs or pressure groups., (8) consumer/client demand, 
(9) attitudes of general public, (10) employee demand, (11) shareholder demand, (12) corporate ethical 
values, (13) protection of corporate reputation, ((14) wishing to remain competitive, (15) economic 
benefits/operational efficiency and (16) stock exchange listing requirements. 
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These companies also tended to rank the sources with a middle, neutral value.75 In the 
case of company 3, their operation only in the UK may limit the extent to which the 
sources listed are relevant though this in itself would be noteworthy since factors such 
as protection of reputation possibly ought to be considered as relevant whatever the 
level of operation, particularly in light of the fact that a large number of companies in 
the UK are SMEs and may not operate internationally but will still be expected to be 
compliant with some anti-corruption instruments.  
 
Companies 70 and 35 were polarised in their views of many of the sources listed. 
Based on a rating scale of 1 -10 in which 1 indicates the source has had no influence 
at all, company 35 scored all the sources listed as 8, 9 or 10 indicating that all were 
felt to be highly influential and that little difference was perceived between the extent 
of influence of each factor. Although some of the data (above) indicates that this 
company may be very actively engaged in combating corruption and might therefore 
utilise all of these sources it is also possible that this result represents an exaggerated 
view. It is questionable whether all sources could be considered so equally influential. 
Nevertheless the data does give some idea of a perceived ranking. On this basis it can 
be seen that the more formal sources - international law, industry specific 
codes/initiatives, national laws in the country of operation and stock exchange listing 
requirements, given a score of 10, are considered to have most influence on company 
behaviour. Whilst these measures may be more formal in nature it is not to say that 
they are all mandatory and it is important to consider this distinction when evaluating 
the influence of different measures. The more fuzzy or less formal sources were 
ranked slightly lower at 9, for instance, the influence of NGOs, shareholder or 
employee demand and the attitudes of the general public. In addition, the national 
laws in non-Head Quarter countries of operation were also ranked at this level 
indicating that for this company domestic measures are more significant than those 
applied elsewhere i.e. Europe, China and Hong Kong. Corporate ethics and economic 
influences were ranked lowest.  
 
These responses can be compared with those given by the US-based company 70. 
International laws, industry codes, stock exchange listing requirements and national 
                                                 
75 Company 3 gave scores of 5 to sources 10, 11, 12 and 13 and a score of 3 to source 3. Company 55 
gave values of 4 to sources 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 and a score of 8 to source 12.  
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laws in the main country of operation, receiving a score of 10, were again all 
considered to be the most influential sources. In addition national government 
policies, corporate ethical values and protection of the reputation were considered to 
be just as important, hinting at a potential variance in data based on jurisdiction.  
Although there was a similar split regarding the sources considered to be less 
influential, in this case the variance in rating was much greater; national laws in other 
countries of operation and voluntary initiatives were scored 3 and the influence of 
NGOs and public attitudes, the wish to remain competitive and perceived economic 
benefits were scored 1. That sources such as voluntary initiatives, NGO involvement 
and employee and public demand are considered to have little or no influence on 
company behaviour with regard to corruption could have significant policy 
implications. Such views appear to be in line with the limited role associated with 
NGOs in prior survey findings. If this view is relevant for companies more generally 
then it raises questions about whether and how the type of stakeholder involvement 
often cited as essential can actually work and how future initiatives should be 
developed.  
5.1.4 Influence of Specific Sources 
 
Company rankings of specific sources reveal more nuanced and, perhaps in some 
cases, contradictory attitudes.76 Despite suggesting that they were highly influential in 
general terms, none of the international instruments listed were scored higher than 1 
by company 70. Overall, the only measures not to be scored 1 by this company were 
the US FCPA, the General Listings Rules of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and 
the LSE Combined Code on Corporate Governance. As well as suggesting that very 
few of the existing anti-corruption instruments are considered to have influenced the 
company’s behaviour this also requires us to examine why international instruments 
were considered so influential in the preceding question.  
                                                 
76 Scores were given on the same basis as before, using a scale of 1 – 10. The sources listed were: 
United Nations Convention, OECD Convention, African Union Convention, SADC Protocol, 
ECOWAS Convention, OAS Convention. Council of Europe Convention, US FCPA, US Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, US False Claims Act, UK Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, UK Public Interest 
Disclosures Act, UK Proceeds of Crime Act, UK Fraud Act, London Stock Exchange Combined Code 
of Corporate Governance, General Listings Rules of London Stock Exchange, listing Rules of New 
York Stock Exchange, Listings Rules of Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Listings Rules of Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, UN Global Compact, OECD Guidelines for Multinational enterprises, ICC Rules of 
Conduct on Combating Extortion and Bribery, Partnering Against Corruption (PACI) Principles for 
Countering Bribery, TI Business Principles for Countering Bribery. 
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 Company 55 also found the US FCPA (scored 7) and the General Listings Rules of 
the LSE and the LSE Combined Code on Corporate Governance (both scored 6) to be 
the most influential sources, despite not having indicated whether stock exchange 
requirements were influential in general terms. Consistent with its preceding more 
general responses, Company 35 gave the LSE sources scores of 10 and likewise cited 
the UN and OECD Conventions as having a significant impact on company 
behaviour, giving these sources scores of 9 (other international sources were given 
neutral scores).  
  
The companies found other national legislative instruments and multilateral 
instruments to have relatively low (or no) influence, though company 35, which 
operates in Hong Kong, also found the HK listing requirements and the UK Public 
Interest Disclosure Act to be relatively influential on behaviour (each scored as 7), 
though interestingly, and in contrast with companies 70 and 55, it regarded the US 
FCPA as having limited influence, giving it a score of 3. The US FCPA has often 
been cited as an instrument that is particularly well known by companies and which 
has made an established impact on corrupt practices. That this was one of very few 
instruments considered by the respondents to have had a real impact on their 
behaviour supports this view but, of course, is based on a very limited number of 
responses and as can be seen, the responses are not completely clear cut. By the same 
token it appears that Stock Exchange rules have been one of the biggest influences on 
companies’ behaviour in relation to corruption. Coupled with the insights into the 
reported influence of different types of instrument generally (above) these findings 
begin to raise questions about the ways in which anti-corruption instruments might be 
structured in order to be effective in changing business behaviour. This very early 
data supports to some extent that of previous surveys which suggest that more 
prescriptive and formal rules are favoured over broad based and voluntary initiatives.  
 
Again company 3 appears to have the least knowledge of anti-corruption instruments, 
indicating in most cases that they do not know what impact the instrument has or are 
not aware of it. Of those that are ranked, the General Listings Rules of the LSE and 
the LSE Combined Code on Corporate Governance, receive scores of 1, indicating 
that they are considered to have no real influence. It can be seen that company 3 
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appears to be emerging as the least active and engaged of the participants with respect 
to corruption or at least is experiencing more difficulties and less successful ways of 
combating the problems, a possibility that may be explored further on the basis of 
more comparative data. This may not be surprising in certain respects given that this 
company indicated that it operates only within the UK. However, there might also be 
a more general issue of lack of awareness, given also the variance in some cases 
between the apparently high influence reported for general anti-corruption strategies 
compared with the lower influence associated with specific instruments and the lack 
of awareness and neutral scoring given in some cases. This would be congruent with 
previous survey findings though it is important also to consider this possibility in the 
context of the importance placed on other anti-corruption sources and strategies 
including alternative measures which may be playing a more important role for 
companies or stakeholder who might act as alternative sources of information.  
 
A similar pattern can be identified when analysing the influence of enforcement 
mechanisms on company behaviour. Company 35 tends to rank the mechanisms as 
having a greater influence on company behaviour than do the other companies but 
again some relative scale in the way that the mechanisms are perceived can be 
observed. In this instance however the perceived influence of mechanisms tends to 
vary more between the individual companies. It is therefore difficult at this stage to 
draw conclusions from the data except to speculate that one reason for the variation 
may be that companies have substantially different experiences of being subject to 
enforcement procedures.  
5.1.5 Respondents’ Views on Further Measures 
 
Overall, companies were neutral or opposed to an increase in the number and 
stringency of applicable government regulations but neutral or in favour of an 
increase in the thoroughness of enforcement and the level and probability of sanctions 
being imposed. The positive scores regarding the latter came from company 70, the 
US based company. Opposition to the former measures came from across the 
companies. Views were mixed regarding an increase in the frequency of enforcement 
activities, with company 70 the only respondent in favour of an increase.  These views 
again hint at a possible issue of jurisdiction with the views of company 70 being 
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particularly supportive of strengthened enforcement. The specific drivers for these 
views are not yet clear however.  
 
Measures which were more frequently favoured, though not unanimously (some 
views were neutral), were an increase in training and education aimed at different 
stakeholders (directors, employees and the general public), increased compliance with 
existing anti-corruption measures by competitors with, increased pressure to combat 
corruption at the board level and the standardisation of codes of conduct. Together 
with the above responses, this may suggest that it is compliance and enforcement 
which are more pressing concerns for these companies rather than lack of regulation 
per se or a desire for increased collaboration.  
 
Views on industry-wide or multi-stakeholder initiatives were mainly neutral, 
suggesting that there is no particular desire for an increase in such approaches, and in 
some cases these are not favoured. In line with findings referred to in Section 1 this 
raises questions about the desirability and effectiveness of industry-led initiatives and 
certain forms of stakeholder collaboration. 
 
In response to the question of whether listed factors would increase or decrease the 
likelihood of their signing up to a new anticorruption initiative, there were mixed 
views but overall these tended to link to those discussed previously. The involvement 
of NGOs, the initiative having the status of a voluntary agreement, the provision that 
organisations would be free to implement the initiative in their own preferred manner 
and a high level of external pressure to achieve the initiative were, overall, least likely 
to act as an incentive. The opportunity for a high level of input into the negotiation 
and development of the initiative, the initiative having the status of a binding 
international legal instrument, the provision for enforcement of the initiative by an 
external body, and the belief that the initiative would actually be enforced, were more 
likely to act as an incentive.  
 
5.1.6 Internal Anti-Corruption Measures 
Despite corruption possibly being a relatively low priority for most of the responding 
companies (see below), all four organisations indicated that they have an anti-
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corruption policy, though only company 3 indicated that this policy was publicly 
available. With the exception of organisation 70, who did not respond to the relevant 
questions, the companies had implemented the policies between 2005 and 2007 and 
all had been reviewed in the last 0 – 6 months. The content of the policies, based on 
the list provided, varied, with most listed aspects being covered by one or more 
companies. Only ‘bribery /kickbacks’ and ‘facilitation payments’ were reported to be 
covered in all four policies.  
 
As for the implementation of these policies, measures were generally aimed at Board 
members and employees and in some cases to aspects of the supply chain.  In this 
respect company 55 reported having introduced a code of conduct/best practice and 
written materials aimed at Board members and employees, company 3 targeted the 
same stakeholders but had only introduced written materials.77 Company 70 indicated 
that a code of conduct/best practice aimed at board members, employees and aspects 
of the supply chain and a signed agreement and contractual conditions aimed at 
employees and aspects of the supply chain had been adopted. An informal audit 
process was also noted to have been introduced for employees and aspects of the 
supply chain. These appear, by and large, to be relatively limited attempts to 
implement the companies’ policies, though relying on contractual provisions may be 
more stringent. Company 35 had adopted more extensive measures – codes of 
conduct/best practice were reportedly aimed at shareholders, NGOs or independent 
bodies and aspects of the supply chain as well as employees and board members. 
Training sessions or workshops were provided in-house for employees, 
NGOs/independent bodies, government agencies and aspects of the supply chain. 
Contractual conditions applied to customers/clients as well as to board members, 
employees and aspects of the supply chain and online and written materials and 
meetings or announcements had also been employed. Despite ranking corruption as a 
relatively low priority in CSR terms, these reported efforts go substantially further 
than those reported by the other companies.  
 
                                                 
77 The company indicated earlier that it had a policy in place regarding corruption so it could be 
assumed that this policy was not targeted at any of the stakeholders listed, raising the question who it is 
aimed at. 
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Efforts to achieve compliance were split. Companies 3 and 55, based in the UK, 
reported having taken very few steps to achieve compliance with the company anti-
corruption policy, relying primarily on the involvement of external auditors. Company 
55 had indicated that external auditing was the only method adopted to achieve 
compliance and indicated that this was found to be ‘somewhat effective’. Company 3 
selected ‘don’t know’ when ranking both the involvement of external auditors and the 
involvement of independent directors. 78  Companies 70 and 35, by contrast, reported 
employing a range of measures which involve internal company efforts such as in-
house monitoring and enforcement processes as well as the involvement of external 
auditors. These companies rated almost all of the measures adopted as ‘highly 
effective’ or in some cases ‘somewhat effective’ in helping to achieve compliance. 
The insights gained so far in this respect suggest that the level and success of 
compliance mechanisms is associated with the individual company as opposed to 
certain mechanisms being generally found to be more useful than others. Again, in the 
full survey it will be important to consider whether this observation stands and if so 
what the particular characteristics of companies reporting successful compliance 
mechanisms are.  
5.1.7 Prioritisation of Corruption in CSR 
Participants were asked to rank different components of CSR in order of priority, with 
1 being the most prioritised and 6 the least prioritised and with zero indicating that the 
aspect was not considered to be relevant. Despite the possible response effects that 
may have been associated with this question, corruption was generally ranked as a 
low priority, with health and safety and human rights emerging as highly prioritised. 
The inverse however was true for the US listed company (see Figure I).79  
 
It is feasible that issues such as health and safety are prioritised due to more 
prescriptive mandatory regulation. This at least is the case in the UK.  This may also 
indicate a possible reason for the variance of the US based company since the US 
FCPA has seen vigorous promotion since its inception. Another possibility is that 
these companies do not prioritise corruption because they consider its prevalence to 
                                                 
78 Company 3 did not rank the value of imposing penalties for breach of the anti-corruption policy 
though indicated that these had been adopted.  
79 It should be remembered that these scores are not absolute values. They instead indicate each 
organisation’s own view of the extent to which these different aspects of CSR are prioritised within 
their organisation. 
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be low and therefore less pressing than other issues. This however is a surprise viewed 
in the context of the findings discussed elsewhere in this report, and the countries in 
which some of the respondents operate (India, China and Mexico) which are rated as 
highly corrupt according to TI’s corruption perceptions. 
 
Figure I: Company CSR Priorities 
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5.2 NGO Responses 
5.2.1 Organisation Characteristics 
Of the three NGOs which had responded in the time frame indicated, two - 
organisations 160 and 27 - were based in the US, one operating at the international 
level and the other at the national level.  The third organisation, 116, was based in the 
UK and indicated that it operated at the local, national, regional and international 
levels. Organisation 160, a membership based organisation, was affiliated with 
businesses and undertakes activities for its corporate membership which is also the 
reported source of funding. Organisation 27 was reported to be independent but with a 
strong relationship with another business oriented organisation, which was cited as a 
source of funding along with multilateral or international donor agencies and 
academic institutions. Organisation 116 was reported to be affiliated with ‘civil 
society organisations, NGOs’ and cited private donors or foundations and other NGOs 
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as sources of funding, noting that ‘a combination of international NGOS and 
foundations fund the coalition's activities at local, regional and global levels’.  
5.2.2 Organisation Orientation and Activities 
 
The stakeholders targeted by these organisations varied. Organisation 161 targeted, in 
particular, businesses, including the overseas intermediaries of MNCs (multinational 
corporations) and SMEs, trade organisations and the professions. Organisation 116 
had a slightly broader target including NGOs, journalists and local interest groups, for 
example. Organisation 27 targeted a similar variety of civil society organisations, 
institutions and businesses but targeted fewer stakeholder types overall. All 
organisations reported targeting MNCs and international organisations. These 
orientations were reflected in the organisations’ reporting of stakeholders with whom 
it worked jointly/in collaboration or on behalf of for the purpose of research or 
monitoring (see below). Organisation 161 worked jointly with and on behalf of both 
MNCs and SMEs and also worked in collaboration with international organisations 
and NGOs. Organisation 116 worked in collaboration with national governments, 
MNCs, SMEs, and local, regional and international NGOs. Organisation 27 worked 
with international organisations and NGOs and with academic faculties. 
5.2.3 Research, Monitoring, Networking and Collaboration 
With respect to research and monitoring,80 Organisation 27 was unsurprisingly, given 
its identified sources of funding and affiliations, reported to be involved with several 
activities and was noted to undertake ‘analysis of policies, issues’, ‘synthesis of 
existing research or publications’, ‘empirical or action research and surveys’ and 
‘benchmarking’. Organisation 116 was also involved in the ‘analysis of policies, 
issues’ and ‘synthesis of existing research or publications’ but was also involved with 
more applied enforcement-based activities in the form of the monitoring of businesses 
and other organisations (on its own behalf) and the application of toolkits for 
enforcement/monitoring. Organisation 160 was involved with benchmarking and the 
production/provision of toolkits for monitoring/enforcement. 
 
                                                 
80 Covering issues such as analysis of policies, issues, production of toolkits for monitoring, 
campaigning and surveys. 
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All organisations reported being involved with some activities in the area of policy 
development and this was particularly true of 116 which reported being involved in 
the development of national, regional and international instruments and various types 
of non-legal initiatives, guidelines and codes and sought to influence governments 
(domestic and foreign), businesses (MNCs and SMEs) and international and regional 
organisations. Organisation 161 focused its policy efforts more narrowly on business 
and industry (as well as international instruments) and 27 was involved in a more 
limited way through the development of policy/law reform and publication of papers, 
targeted at businesses, other NGOs and the general public.   
 
Involvement in ‘campaigning and activism’ was more limited in the case of the US 
based organisations; 27 cited ‘attendance at meetings/workshops’ as its only activity 
in this category as did 161 which also noted that  
‘We work with our member companies to ensure that they are aware of local, 
national and international developments in anti-corruption policy and the 
enforcement of anti-corruption laws. We also conduct due diligence on and 
provide training to commercial third parties that work with our multinational 
member countries to ensure that they are conducting their business in a 
transparent manner.’ 
  
Organisation 116 was again involved in a broader range of activities including 
lobbying directed at a broad range of stakeholders including governments, industry 
associations, businesses, high commissions and regional and international 
organisations. Its activities were reported to be targeted at all levels from local to 
international.81  
 
In relation to networking and collaboration, there was some overlap between 
responding organisations: 116 again interacted with stakeholders through a range of 
activities - information and resource sharing, development and/or implementation of 
policies or programmes - and was identified as belonging to a ‘coalition or network of 
NGOs’ and ‘a multi-stakeholder coalition or network’. Organisation 161 was involved 
only with information sharing and 27 in information sharing and development and/or 
implementation of policies or programmes. These organisations were not members of 
any coalition or network. 
                                                 
81 Organisation 160 reported targeting activities at the international level and organisation 27 did not 
respond. 
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5.2.4 Capacity Building and Awareness Raising 
Organisation 160 was involved in several specific activities within the category 
‘capacity building and provision of services’ and these were all reported to be aimed 
at businesses though training was also aimed at government agencies. Organisation 27 
also targeted businesses in respect of its capacity building activities and provision of 
services though it was also involved with the production of guidelines aimed at the 
general public. A variety of activities was also undertaken by 116 and in this case all 
were aimed at the general public. The organisations also undertook a range of 
activities within the category ‘awareness raising’. With respect to outreach work 
various stakeholders were targeted but all three organisations reported targeting 
SMEs. Very few print based or alternative approaches were employed for the purpose 
of awareness raising but several web-based activities were cited including the 
provision of policy briefings, education courses/programmes, newsletters, research 
results/reports82 and a database of materials83. The use of broadcast media was also 
cited by organisations 160 and 116. 
 
The different focuses of these organisations suggested by their affiliations and cited 
sources of funding can be clearly recognised based on their involvement with 
different types of activity, as has been highlighted. Organisation 161 adopts a more 
facilitative or cooperative role, undertaking activities which assist or enable 
businesses (i.e. its corporate members), the primary focus of its activities. 
Organisation 27 targets a range of stakeholders and is involved in different types of 
activity but focuses primarily on academic or policy focused work. Organisation 116 
works with a variety of stakeholders and focuses more on direct actions such as 
campaigning and capacity building, including activities targeted at the general public 
as well as businesses (and others). The three organisations offer very different profiles 
and approaches in their role and activities. Certainly there is no holistic approach to be 
identified from the general interactions and activities which were reported though this 
is of course not unexpected given the range of NGOs involved in the sample. What is 
interesting, and will be an important factor to analyse in the full data set is how, if at 
all, these different approaches correspond with different anti-corruption efforts and 
                                                 
82 Organisation 27 cited providing these in print as well as on a website.  
83 Company 161 indicated that they maintain a database of ‘the gifts and hospitality rules and laws and 
regulations regarding the retention of commercial third intermediaries in over 70 countries.’ 
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the experience of these NGOs in working with stakeholders, particularly businesses 
and in return, how these experiences correspond with the experiences and perceptions 
of participating companies.  
5.2.5 Promotion of CSR 
 
Organisations were asked whether they actively support or promote CSR initiatives. 
Only organisation 27 indicated that it did not. However, the two responding 
organisations indicated that all areas of CSR listed84 were considered not to be 
relevant, with the exception of corruption which in both cases was ranked ‘1’ on a 
scale indicating that ‘1’ is the most prioritised aspect and ‘6’ is the least prioritised 
aspect.  
 
In response to the question ‘Do you think that promotion or support of CSR initiatives 
may be relevant to your organisation in the future?’ organisation 161 commented, ‘the 
adoption of corporate codes of social responsibility, especially in the area of anti-
corruption initiatives will continue to be a priority for our organization.’ Organisation 
27 commented ‘we take an enterprise view of business ethics so we tend to view CSR 
initiatives as very important, but mostly in terms of how organizations create value for 
their shareholders’. These organisations (161 and 27) also responded to the question 
which asked them to rank, on a scale of 1-10, the extent to which different sources 
and influences have led to an improvement in CSR.85 The responses are mixed and 
cannot provide, at this stage, an idea of the more general experience of NGOs. In 
several cases the perceptions of the two organisations contrasted strongly, though one 
possibility here is that this correlates with the type of stakeholder the organisation 
works with and the involvement that they have with them. For instance, organisation 
27 indicated that the general public, collective activists and local NGOs had led to a 
strong improvement (these were ranked ‘8’ or higher) but organisation 160 considered 
these to have had a neutral impact or worse. The converse was true for trade unions, 
international and regional organisations and domestic and foreign governments, which 
were ranked favourably by organisation 160 but not by 27. As stated, this gives a very 
uneven picture and needs to be explored further in light of additional data.  
                                                 
84 Environmental protection; equality and anti-discrimination; labour rights and standards; corruption; 
health and safety; human rights. 
85 With 1 indicating that the source has had no impact and 10 indicating that the source has had a 
significant impact.  
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 In addition to the obviously different experiences of these organisations it is 
interesting to note that these observations were made despite the fact that all aspects 
of CSR except corruption were considered irrelevant by organisation 160 and that 
organisation 27 did not rank the aspects of CSR and indicated that it did not actively 
support CSR initiatives. The basis on which these observations of CSR influences 
were made is then somewhat opaque. One possibility is that these perceptions are 
based wholly on the organisations experiences with corruption. Another is that aspects 
of CSR which were not listed informed the respondents’ perceptions. 
5.2.6 Organisations’ Activities and Experiences in Combating Corruption 
 
Only organisation 27 reported not having policies or programmes in place specifically 
related to corruption giving as reason ‘the institute’s mission is to embed ethics into 
the everyday business decision-making and practice of organisations. While this, of 
course, includes corruption, it is much broader than that. There are other organisations 
much better equipped to deal with these issues and we support their efforts and rely on 
their findings in the work that we do.’ This response is interesting in that it seems to 
some extent counter-intuitive. Whilst the organisation seeks to embed ethics, 
including anti-corruption aims, into business decision-making, it considers that the 
role of dealing with corruption should fall on other ‘better equipped’ organisations. 
This raises questions about how this ‘embedding’ can be achieved. The role played by 
this organisation is somewhat mysterious then given that it also indicated that it did 
not actively support CSR initiatives but does undertake activities in areas such as 
research, capacity building and awareness raising. The organisation indicated that it 
targets a variety of stakeholders though it is not completely clear how these relate to 
the objective of embedding of ethics into business decision making. It may be that the 
comments given above do not relate to these broader aspects of the organisation’s 
activities.  
 
5.2.7 Policies, Programme Orientation and Focus 
 
The policies and programmes of organisation 160 were confined to the private sector 
whilst that of 116 applied also to the public sector, again reflecting the different 
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orientations of these organisations, observed above. The stakeholders which each 
organisation identified as targeting with respect to its anti-corruption activities also 
reflect these orientations, though there is a good deal of overlap in this case and, 
perhaps as importantly, a good deal of overlap in the stakeholders that are not 
targeted. Organisation 160 cited MNCs, SMEs and ‘other’ businesses 
(intermediaries), foreign governments, chambers of commerce and 
professional/industry/trade bodies. Organisation 116 cited international NGOs, 
international organisations, MNCs, SMEs and domestic and foreign governments. 
Responses on the organisations’ focus with respect to corruption work are worth 
presenting here: 
Organisation 160 “We focus mainly on commercial anti-bribery issues. We work 
with our membership to help them develop compliance programs, conduct training 
and perform due diligence on their overseas commercial intermediaries to ensure that 
they [are] engaging in transparent business practices. We attempt to hold training 
workshops in each region annually. In some countries, we invite local government 
officials to participate in these training workshops in order to foster a discussion on 
anti-bribery issues between the government and the business community. We also 
provide our members with compliance tools such as guidebooks on various issues, 
such as eliminating the use of facilitation payments, as well as guidelines on various 
anti-bribery compliance initiatives such as how due diligence is necessary on various 
commercial third party relationships. These guidebooks and guidelines are contained 
on our resource center along with information of the gifts and hospitality laws and the 
laws regarding the retention of 3rd party intermediaries in over 70 countries.” 
 
Organisation 116 ‘We help citizens of resource-rich developing countries hold their 
governments accountable for the management of revenues from the oil, gas and 
mining industries. Natural resource revenues are an important source of income for 
governments of over 50 developing countries, including Angola, Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, Nigeria and Venezuela. When properly managed these revenues should 
serve as a basis for poverty reduction, economic growth and development rather than 
exacerbating corruption, conflict and social divisiveness. 
…”. 
 
These comments give a clear illustration of the two very diverse approaches being 
employed by these responding organisations.86 Both organisations cited positive 
outcomes arising from their involvement. What is not known at this stage is to what 
                                                 
86 The stakeholders which each organisation identified as targeting with respect to its anti-corruption 
activities again reflects the orientations identified though there is a good deal of overlap in this case 
and, perhaps as importantly, a good deal of overlap in the stakeholders that are not targeted. 
Organisation 160 cited MNCs, SMEs and ‘other’ businesses (intermediaries), foreign governments, 
chambers of commerce and professional/industry/trade bodies. Organisation 116 cited international 
NGOs, international organisations, MNCs, SMEs and domestic and foreign governments. 
 62
extent either approach is representative of approaches commonly employed by NGOs 
with respect to corruption and to what extent, if at all, either approach may relate to 
the perceptions and experiences of businesses which have worked with NGOs. The 
linking of such experiences and perceptions along with the identification of the 
different orientations and of relevant NGOs may enable the development of a more 
refined conceptualisation of NGO involvement in combating corruption in business in 
later stages of analysis. 
 
In terms of their experiences of working with the stakeholders identified organisation 
160, working primarily with businesses, offers some encouraging comments. The 
respondent indicates that a strength of working with these stakeholders is that the 
companies which become members are ‘motivated to do the right thing’ and ‘eager 
for guidance’. The only limitation identified is that the organisation’s work 
necessarily only combats the supply side of bribery. 
 5.2.8 Organisations’ Perceptions of Anti-Corruption Instruments 
 
The NGOs were also asked to rank the extent to which they considered different 
measures have assisted in combating corruption in international business.87 
Respondents were asked to rank the measures on a scale of 1 – 10 with 1 indicating 
that the measure had no impact at all and 10 indicating that it had a significant impact. 
Organisation 116 did not respond to the question but of the data obtained perhaps the 
most striking finding is that overall the measures were ranked highly (that is, regarded 
as significant) and no measure was ranked below 4. There was again some difference 
in perceptions, particularly with respect to ‘national laws in other countries of 
operation’, ‘[National] Government policies’, and ‘attitudes of general public’ but in 
many cases respondents were in agreement. This consistency is reflected in several, 
but not all cases in respect of rankings of specific instruments. For example, national 
legislative measures were ranked higher as a general category than in the case of some 
of the specific instruments by Organisation 27, which also indicated in several cases 
that they ‘don’t know’ or are not aware of the source.  Attitudes towards specific anti-
corruption measures also varied somewhat between the two responding organisations 
and further data is required to enable reliable comments to be made in this respect. It 
                                                 
87 See fn 64 for list of measures and specific sources. 
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is noteworthy however that Stock Exchange rules were perceived in more neutral 
terms than they were by the responding companies and that, conversely, multilateral 
instruments were seen to be more influential. The US FCPA and the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act were seen as the most influential of the listed instruments by the two responding 
NGOs. 
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Section 6 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This Report has highlighted the nature of the multi-faceted approach to combating 
corruption in international business. The strategies operate from the local level, for 
example through civil society action and the adoption of corporate codes of conduct, 
to the international level in the form of conventions and international agreements. The 
regulatory nature of these strategies also varies and includes traditional regulation 
through national legislative and enforcement measures and self-regulation and 
voluntary approaches, which may be based on company policies and procedures or 
may involve a broader range of stakeholders, as in industry-wide initiatives. As well 
as the influence of legal restrictions, other sources of rules and regulatory influences 
are important, such as business custom and practice, market influences and financial 
reporting rules, civil society demands. What is known is that all of the relevant 
strategies seek to eliminate corrupt practices in the areas to which they are applicable. 
What was not known is the extent to which these different strategies are effective (in 
the context of international business), to what extent businesses and NGOs are aware 
of the different strategies and are or are not influenced by them, the reasons for this, 
the ways in which the different strategies, motivations and drivers are interrelated in 
terms of influencing company behaviour, and what the drivers and influencing factors 
are which may preclude further progress. This Interim Report has sought to begin 
addressing these questions with a view to understanding how future anti-corruption 
efforts may be strengthened. Whilst the findings of previous surveys have provided a 
starting point, the survey being implemented by the present authors should lead to a 
more complete understanding of these issues.  
 
The two sets of findings discussed in this Report give some indication of company 
attitudes and potential regulatory limitations or bottlenecks. Although the synthesis of 
previous surveys is illuminating in certain respects the findings of these raise many 
more questions. There is no valid way to explain the differences (or similarities) 
arising, for instance, in respect of country and sectoral differences. Similarly, whilst 
those findings indicate, for example, difficulties with implementation of both internal 
and external measures, there is not sufficient depth of analysis or examination of 
variables to explain why companies are not enforcing policies, are not aware of 
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regulations or do not think legislation will have the desired outcomes. Without this 
understanding it may be possible to describe weaknesses in a limited way but it will 
not be possible to address them. Addressing this gap is the aim of the present authors’ 
survey but at this stage only the tentative issues from the pilot phase may be 
commented upon, including the important issue of non-response. 
 
Whilst too limited to allow for generalisations, some interesting tentative observations 
can be made from a reading of the pilot survey along with those of previous surveys. 
Surveys to date, for instance, have not explored the role played by NGOs and how this 
relates to business attitudes to such stakeholder involvement. Our pilot findings 
indicate that this is an important issue as NGOs vary in their approaches to combating 
corruption suggesting that they should not be lumped together when considering their 
involvement as a stakeholder. These initial responses further suggest that there may be 
a difference between the ways NGOs perceive their contribution compared with the 
way companies see NGO involvement. NGOs, unsurprisingly, feel positive about 
their impact on corruption in international business. But companies seem to suggest 
that NGO involvement is not considered particularly important or effective in relation 
to company practices.  
 
Within the field of CSR the emerging picture is that its incorporation may be more 
limited than might have been assumed. Companies did not prioritise corruption highly 
in comparison with certain other aspects of CSR and though NGOs did apparently 
prioritise corruption highly they did not prioritise other aspects of CSR, suggesting 
perhaps that corruption work was seen as separate from this broader field. This 
divergence of views again highlights the importance of identifying and understanding 
the views of these different stakeholders in order to consider how future efforts might 
be made more effective. Other differences can also be observed amongst the 
participants. The companies based in the UK seem to have engaged with anti-
corruption strategies to a lesser degree than those based elsewhere for instance but at 
this stage there are a broad range of other variables which may be relevant and these 
should be explored when a greater range of data is available.  
 
These pilot findings also suggest that whilst certain legal measures may not be 
considered to be highly relevant to companies, other important sources, such as stock 
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exchange requirements, may be shaping company attitudes and practices, The 
influence of some sources appears to be mixed both between and within stakeholder 
groups, indicating that further variables, yet to be understood, shape the attitudes of 
these stakeholders. 
 
The matter of non-response is important not only because, if extended to the full 
survey it is likely to provide only a partial picture of the issues  to difficulties in terms 
of gaining a complete and reliable picture in response to the research aims and 
questions but also because, when read together with the apparent unwillingness of 
other companies to be involved in survey research based on company policies, it 
suggests that companies remain reluctant to engage with the anti-corruption agenda. 
This raises the important issue of what more needs to be done for this agenda to be 
received and responded to with the seriousness it deserves. 
 
While in some cases the findings of our pilot survey appear to be consistent with those 
of prior surveys, there are also conflicting findings. Of course, it is too early to make 
assumptions about whether such observations will hold true for the full survey but the 
data and findings presented provide further indicators of potential limitations and 
bottlenecks in existing strategies and regulations which attempt to tackle corruption in 
international business and at the same time highlight the need for further data which 
will allow these emerging possibilities and questions to be addressed. It is anticipated 
that such data will be presented in the final report.  
Table I: Anti-corruption Instruments (As of December 2008) 
Some key anti-corruption instruments and their characteristics, grouped broadly according to instrument type.88  
 
Conventions 
Date Instrument Number of signatories/members 
Entry into force:14 December 2005 United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC) 
Signatories: 140, Parties: 117 
Entry into force: 6 July 2005 Southern African Development Community 
Protocol against Corruption (SADC 
Protocol) 
Signatories: 14, Ratifications: 9  
Entry into force: 1 November 2003  Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on 
Corruption 
Signatories: 42, Ratifications: 33 
Entry into force: 
5 August 2006 
African Union Convention on Preventing 
and Combating Corruption (AU 
Convention) 
Signatories 38, Ratifications 11  
Adopted 21 December 2001, Not yet 
in force. 
Economic Community Of West African 
States Protocol on the Fight against 
Corruption (ECOWAS Protocol) 
 
Entry into force: 1 July 2002 Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention 
on Corruption 
Signatories: 49, Ratifications: 41 
Entry into force: 15 February 1999. OECD Convention on the Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions (OECD Convention) 
37 Parties (all 30 OECD countries and Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, 
Estonia, Slovenia and South Africa) 
Entry into force: 3 June 1997  Inter-American Convention against 
Corruption  
(OAS Convention) 
 
Signatories: 34, Parties: 33  
Financial/market measures 
Date Instrument Number of signatories/members 
Present version published July 2003 The Financial Reporting Council, The 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
 
“All companies incorporated in the UK and listed on the Main Market of 
the London Stock Exchange are required under the Listing Rules to 
report on how they have applied the Combined Code in their annual 
                                                 
88 For further examples see, for instance, http://www.biac.org/pubs/anti-bribery_resource/section_3.htm  
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report and accounts.” 
Launched February 2006, 
implementation over 2 years from 
July 2006 
FTSE 4Good criteria for Countering Bribery Businesses meeting set criteria 
 
 
 
Industry initiatives 
Date  Instrument Number of signatories/members 
Launched June 2003 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 23 candidate countries, 0 compliant countries, 37 ‘actively supporting’ 
oil, gas and mining companies, further multi-stakeholder involvement 
Introduced 1999, Revised 2003 ICC: Fighting Corruption - A Corporate 
Practice Manual 
NA 
Introduced 1977, last revised 2005 International Chamber of Commerce, ICC 
Rules of Conduct and Recommendations 
for Combating Extortion and Bribery  
NA 
Multi-stakeholder and NGO initiatives 
Date Instrument Number of signatories/members 
Adopted 24 June 2004 UN Global Compact (Principle 10) 
 
Various stakeholders. “More than 5600 participants, including over 4300 
businesses in 120 countries around the world” (Source: Global 
Compact) 
Launched June 2002 Publish What You Pay 305 signatory NGOs 
2002: applied initially to energy, 
engineering and construction 
sectors, PACI launched officially in 
2004 
World Economic Forum, Partnering Against 
Corruption Initiative, Principles for 
Countering Bribery  
 
 
140 signatory supporters 
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Table II: Offences created by the Anti-Corruption Conventions  
(OAS Convention, OECD Convention, COE Convention & Protocol, SADC Protocol, ECOWAS Protocol, AU Convention and UN Convention) 
Offences and Related 
Provisions 
OAS Con. OECD Con. COE Con. & 
Protocol 
SADC Protocol ECOWAS  
Protocol 
AU Con. UN Con. 
 Active bribery of 
domestic public official 
Art VII(1)b 
‘Public official’, ‘government 
official’, ‘public servant’ 
construed widely to include 
those who have been 
selected, appointed or 
elected to perform activities 
or functions in the name of 
the State at any level of its 
hierarchy (Art I). 
 
 
 
Art 2 
(Note that 
offences in COE 
Convention are 
couched in 
mandatory terms 
with the use of the 
phrase ‘shall 
adopt’.) 
Art 3(1)(b) 
‘Public official’ 
widely construed to 
include those in 
employment of 
state, its agencies, 
legislative, 
executive and 
judicial branch.  
Art 6(1)(b) 
‘Public official’ 
construed as 
person selected, 
appointed or 
elected and who 
perform public 
functions on a 
permanent or 
temporary basis. 
Art 4(b) 
‘Public official’ 
construed as official 
or employee of State 
or its agencies who 
have been elected, 
selected or 
appointed to perform 
functions in the 
name of the State. 
Art 15 (a) 
Art 2(a)  
Public Official  
construed  
widely to 
include  
person  
holding 
legislative, 
executive,  
administrative  
or judicial office
Passive bribery of 
domestic public official 
Art VI(1)(a)  Art 3 Art 3(1)(a) Art 6(1)(a) Art 4(a) Art 15(b) 
Passive bribery of foreign 
public official 
  Art 5    Art 16(2) 
Active bribery of foreign 
public official 
Art VIII Art 1 but restricted to international 
business transactions 
No definition of international business 
transaction but Preamble states that it 
is to include trade and investment. 
Art 5 
 
 
 
 
Art 6 Art 12(1)  Art 16(1)  
Bribery of members of 
foreign public assemblies; 
officials of international 
organisations; 
Debatable. See above on 
definition of ‘public official’ 
but unlikely to include 
officials of international 
‘Foreign public official’ is construed 
widely in Art 1(4) to mean any person 
holding a legislative, administrative or 
judicial office of a foreign country, 
Arts 6, 9, 10 & 11 
(Cover both active 
and passive 
bribery) 
See Arts 6 & 1. No definition of 
foreign public 
official. However 
could apply to 
 Art 16 
See Arts 
2(b) & (c) for 
definition. 
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members of international 
parliamentary assemblies; 
judges and official of 
International Courts 
organisations. whether elected or appointed; any 
person exercising a public function, 
and any official of a public 
international organisation. ‘Foreign 
country’ includes all levels of 
government. 
these classes of 
persons by 
analogy.  
Active bribery in private 
sector 
  Art 7 Art 3(1)(e) Art 6(5)(a) Art 11 Art 21(a) 
Passive bribery in private 
sector 
  Art 8 As above. Art 6(5)(b) Art 11 Art 21(b)ø 
Active bribery of foreign 
arbitrators 
Debatable. See Art 1(4) Art 4 of Protocol See above. See above. 
(Debatable since 
no definition of 
foreign public 
official.)  
See above. See above. 
Bribery of domestic jurors Debatable. See definition of 
‘public official’ above.  
 Art 5 of Protocol See above 
(Debatable) 
See above in 
respect of domestic 
arbitrators. 
See above 
(Debatable) 
See above. 
Bribery of foreign jurors See definition of ‘public 
official’ above. 
 Art 6 of Protocol 
 
See above 
(Debatable) 
See above in 
respect of foreign 
arbitrators. 
 See above. 
 Illicit enrichment Art IX A controversial 
provision due to reversal of 
burden of proof.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Art 6(3)(a) Art 8 Art 20. 
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Diversion of monies, 
securities, property etc for 
purposes unrelated to 
those for which they were 
intended by public official 
for own/third party benefit. 
See Art XI(1)(b)   Art 3(d) Art 6(1)(e) Art 4(d)  Art 17. 
Art 22 for 
private 
sector. 
Omission/act in discharge 
of duties by public official 
for illicitly obtaining 
benefit for himself/third 
party 
Art VI (1)(c)   Art 3(c)  Art 4(c) Art 19. 
Trading in Influence   Art 12 Art 3(f) Covers both 
public and private 
sectors. 
Arts 6(2) 
 (c ) & (d) 
Art 4(f) Art 18. 
Fraudulent 
Use/Concealment of  
Property Derived through 
Corruption Offences 
Art VI(1)(d)   Art 8(g) Art 7 Art 4(b) Art 24 
Transparency in Funding 
of Political Parties 
 
 
 
    Art 10  
Participatory Acts as 
principal, co-principal, 
instigator, accomplice or 
accessory  
Art VI(1)(e) 
 
 
Art 1(2) Art 15 
 
 
Art 3(h) Art 7 Art 4(i) Art 27. 
Accounting Offences  Art 8  Art 14  Art 4   
Corporate Liability   Art 2. 
 
 
Art 18 Legal 
person can be 
held liable for 
 Art 11 See Art 11(3). Art 26. 
 72
  
 
 
 
active bribery, 
trading in 
influence and 
money 
laundering. 
Tax Deductibility of 
Expenses 
Art III (6) See Para IV Revised 
Recommendation DAFFE/IME/BR (97) 
20. 
 Art 4    
Bank Secrecy  Art XVI   Art 23 Art 8  Art 17 Art 40 
Laundering of Proceeds  Art 7 Art 13  Art 7 Art 6 Art 23 
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Table III: Summary of anti-corruption surveys 
Author Date Title Details of sample  Data collection 
methods 
Overview 
Corruption and bribery surveys (general)  
Ernst & Young 
(Ernst & Young 
2008) 
2008 Corruption or 
Compliance: 
Weighing the Costs. 
10th global fraud 
survey 
1186 ‘senior decision-makers’ in large 
organisation. “The sample was structured 
to include respondents from key parts of 
the company, including senior financial 
and risk managers as well as the heads 
of legal, compliance and internal audit 
groups’.  
Telephone interviews. 
Interviews were 
conducted in local 
languages in 33 
countries. 
Aims to understand how companies are 
managing the risks associated with bribery of 
foreign officials, particularly in light of strong 
enforcement of the US FCPA. Looks at 
company experience of bribery, views on 
enforcement of anti-bribery and corruption 
laws, tools used to manage these risks e.g. 
internal auditing and awareness of FCPA. 
Price 
Waterhouse 
Coopers 
(PwC 2008) 
2008 Confronting 
Corruption: The 
Business Case for 
an Effective Anti-
Corruption Program 
390 executives Online survey Considers corruption from perspective of 
business risk and discusses data in the 
context of the business case for addressing 
corruption. Reports findings on impact and 
incidence of corruption, importance placed on 
business impacts of corruption e.g. impact on 
reputation, reported implementation and 
effectiveness of internal controls 
KPMG (Forensic) 
(KPMG 2007) 
2007 Overseas Bribery 
and Corruption 
More than 100 FTSE 350 companies Survey (unspecified) Reports on company knowledge of the US 
FCPA and UK ATCSA, incidence of bribery 
and corruption practices and discusses of how 
companies are addressing and could address 
corruption. 
 
 
 
Price 
Waterhouse 
Coopers (with 
Martin Luther 
University Economy 
and Crime 
Research Centre) 
(PwC 2007) 
2007 Economic Crime: 
People, Culture and 
Controls 
5400 respondents randomly selected. 
Target number of respondents in each 
country was based on GDP. Survey also 
involved a review of the results from 2026 
cases of fraud reported by 1435 
companies and the opinions of 1568 self-
accredited experts on the impact of 
economic crime in seen emerging 
markets. 
Computer assisted 
interviews (telephone and 
web) conducted in 40 
countries by specially 
trained native language 
speakers. 
Focuses on fraud and considers corruption as 
an aspect of this. Looks at perceived and 
reported levels of fraud, cost of fraud to 
companies, adoption of fraud risk 
management strategies and impacts of ethics 
and compliance programmes, reported 
motivations and profile of those committing 
fraud and issues with emerging economies. 
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Simmons & 
Simmons 
2006 International 
Business Attitudes to 
Corruption  
350 companies based in seven 
jurisdictions (UK, US, Germany, France, 
the Netherlands, Brazil and Hong Kong) 
Telephone interviews Considers corruption is a major obstacle to 
international business. Looks at incidence and 
costs of corruption for businesses, impact of 
anti-corruption legislation including 
respondents’ awareness of domestic 
legislation and ‘emerging best practice’ 
regarding the adoption of internal measures. 
Ethical Investment 
Research Services 
(EIRIS) 
2005 Corporate Codes of 
Business Ethics: 
an International 
Survey of Bribery 
and Ethical 
Standards in 
Companies 
1,966 companies on the FTSE All-world 
Developed Index + an additional 440 
smaller UK companies 
Analysis of existence and 
scope of codes of ethics 
and management 
systems 
Measures the quality of ethics codes and 
business ethics management systems based 
on a scale. Discusses risk factors based on 
own data as well as TI and WB indices. 
 
 
Sector specific corruption surveys 
Association of 
Certified Chartered 
Accountants 
(ACCA) 
2007 Bribery and 
Corruption: the 
impact on UK SMEs 
The sample consisted of two main 
groups: those actually working in SMEs 
as accountants or general managers and 
those in public practice who provide 
professional services to SMEs. 
Responses were received from 558 
members 
 Discusses issue for SMEs in light of the 
OECDS call for more to be done in respect of 
these businesses. Notes importance of 
accountants in this area including their 
advisory role to businesses. Examines 
participants understanding of corrupt 
practices, its occurrence for SMEs and the 
relevance of different sources of help or 
assistance. 
Chartered Institute 
of Builders 
(CIOB) 
2006 Corruption in the UK 
Construction Sector 
1404 respondents Web-based questionnaire 
open to anyone in the UK 
(members and non-
members) 
Focuses on perceived presence of different 
types of corruption encountered in the 
construction industry and detection and 
reporting of fraud and corruption (with fraud 
viewed as an aspect of corruption).  
CSR surveys 
KPMG and 
University of 
Amsterdam 
(KPMG 2005) 
2005 International Survey 
of Corporate 
Responsibility 
Reporting 
The top 250 of the Fortune 500 and top 
100 companies in 16 countries. Response 
rate was 98% 
Questionnaires and 
analysis of corporate 
reports 
Discuss ‘corporate responsibility’ as a driver of 
financial performance and indicator of non-
financial performance. Discusses level of 
reporting, trends in CR reporting such as 
broadening of scope and inclusion of 
assurance statements, drivers for CR. 
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Consultancy and 
Research for 
Environmental 
Management 
(CREM) 
2004 Corporate 
responsibility in 
India: Policy and 
Practices of Dutch 
Companies 
Written survey of 40 Dutch companies 
operating in India, interviews held with 9 
companies in the Netherlands, with their 
daughter companies or suppliers in India 
and with ‘a large number’ of relevant 
stakeholders in India 
Inventory of CSR policy, 
written survey, 
interviews.  
Discuss in detail different aspects of CSR 
(social, environmental and economic – 
including corruption) and survey findings in 
respect of the frame of reference developed 
for the purpose of the research (mainly 
qualitative). 
Institute of Directors 
(IoD) 
2002 Corporate Social 
Responsibility: IoD 
Member Opinion 
Survey 
500 respondents Telephone interviews Focuses on social and environmental aspects 
of CSR including discussion at board level and 
CSR reporting. Also examines ‘specific CSR 
issues’ which focus on employment and 
equality issues and on awareness of CSR 
initiatives and the influence of different 
stakeholders in influencing CSR policy. 
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Appendix I: Questions and Responses: companies 
Self-identifying information and similar has been removed to preserve anonymity. 
 
SECTION 1: ABOUT CORRUPTION AND YOUR ORGANISATION’S POLICIES 
 
1(A) Where is your head office? 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO.  
70 USA 
55 UK 
3 UK 
35 BVI 
 
1(B) In which country/countries are you listed on a stock exchange? 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO.  
70 UK AIM 
55 UK  
3 UK 
35 UK AIM 
 
1(C) Please list the countries where your organisation operates (continue on a separate sheet if required) 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO.  
70 US, INDIA, MEXICO 
55 WORLDWIDE EXCEPT CHINA, JAPAN, CANADA [?] 
3 UK 
35 BVI, CHINA, EUROPE, HK 
 
 
2. CSR priorities 
Below is a list of some different aspects of corporate social responsibility. Please rank these aspects according to the 
extent to which they are prioritised within your organisation. Rank the most prioritised aspect ‘1’ and the least 
prioritised aspect ‘6'. You may replace a number with 'X' if you do not consider the aspect to be relevant. 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. Env Protection Equality Labour Corruption Health And Safety Human Rights 
70 2 3 5 1 4 6 
55 4 3 6 5 2 1 
3 3 2 4 5 1 0 
35 5 0 3 4 1 2 
 
3. Does your organisation have a policy or policies in place to combat corruption?  
Yes      GO TO QUESTION 5         No      GO TO QUESTION 4 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 
[Yes = 1, No = 0) 
 
70 1 
55 1 
3 1 
35 1 
 
4 (A) If you answered ‘NO’ please state in brief the reasons why your organisation has not adopted a policy 
related to corruption.  
QUESTIONNAIRE NO.  
70 Unit non-response 
55 Unit non-response 
3 Unit non-response 
35 Unit non-response 
 
 
4 (B) Has your organisation considered, or is it considering, adopting a policy related to corruption? What 
are the reasons for this?  
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QUESTIONNAIRE NO.  
70 Unit non-response 
55 Unit non-response 
3 Unit non-response 
35 Unit non-response 
 
IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED QUESTION 4, PLEASE RETURN THIS COMPLETED VERSION AS INDICATED. END 
OF QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
5(A) In what year(s) was/were your policy or policies first established? 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO.  
70 Unit non-response 
55 2006 
3 2007 
35 2005 
 
5(B) When was your corruption policy last reviewed? 
0–6 months ago    7–12 months ago    13–24 months ago    
25–36 months ago    More than 36 months ago   
QUESTIONNAIRE NO.  
70 Unit non-response 
55 0-6MONTHS 
3 0-6MONTHS 
35 0-6MONTHS 
 
6(A) Is the policy in written form?  Yes    No    
 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO 
[Yes = 1, No = 0] 
 
70 1 
55 1 
3 1 
35 1 
 
6(B) Is the policy publicly available?  (if ‘YES’, please provide a copy if possible) 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO 
[Yes = 1, No = 0] 
 
70 Unit non-response 
55 0 
3 1 
35 0 
 
7. Please identify which of the following potential aspects of corruption, if any, are directly addressed in your 
organisation's written policy/policies. Tick all that are relevant.  
The policy might address the intentional or unintentional involvement with, offering, promising, giving, receiving or 
solicitation of the following: 
 
  [Yes = 1, No = 0] 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO 70 55 3 35 
Acts or omissions carried out in country of head office 1 1 1 0 
Acts or omissions carried out in other countries of business 1 1 0 1 
Activities of the main/parent organization 1 1 1 0 
Activities in other aspects of the supply chain 1 1 0 1 
Bribery, kickbacks 1 1 1 1 
Facilitation payments 1 1 1 1 
Giving gifts, benefits, hospitality 1 1 1 0 
Receiving gifts, benefits, hospitality 1 1 1 0 
Irregularities in invoicing 1 0 0 1 
Recording of non-existent expenditure 1 0 0 0 
Off-the-book accounting 0 0 0 1 
Other off-the-book record keeping 0 0 0 0 
Use of false documents 0 0 0 1 
Intentional destruction of book-keeping documents earlier than foreseen by law 0 0 0 1 
Embezzlement 1 0 0 1 
Money Laundering 1 0 0 0 
Insider trading 1 1 0 1 
Trading in influence 0 0 0 0 
Conflict of interest 1 0 0 0 
Nepotism/granting advantage to family or friends 1 0 0 1 
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Political financial contributions/fundraising 1 1 0 0 
Other (please specify) 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
8. Are there any reasons why some aspects are not addressed?  Are there any other aspects you would like 
to include?  
QUESTIONNAIRE 
NO 
 
70 We do not see a significant specific issue and it is covered in the [generality] of the policy 
55 We are a young company only formed in 2006. Fully comprehensive procedures take time to 
develop and flesh out 
3 Unit non-response 
 
35 The factory is the largest subsidiary company of [x] which is located in China. Therefore, 
operating the business in China is the most important and complicated thing. The parent 
companies would be easy to handle with, so there are not too many things to be addressed. 
 
9(A) Overall, to what extent, if at all, do you consider that corruption is present in the following instances? 
Please circle the number which you consider is most appropriate, with 1 being not at all corrupt and 10 being entirely 
corrupt. Circle X for ‘don’t know’.  
 
(i) Within your organisation 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO [X = 11] 
70 1 
55 1 
3 1 
35 2 
          
(ii) Within the industry in which you operate   
QUESTIONNAIRE NO [X = 11] 
70 2 
55 5 
3 11 
35 2 
 
9(B) What types of corruption, if any, are most prevalent in (ii)? 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
NO  
70 
We deal with governments in third world countries - Africa and Asia and therefore FCPA is 
an issue always 
55 Bribes for contract awards and senior level access 
3  
35 … (Not included to maintain anonymity) 
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SECTION 2: IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
 
10. How, if at all, has your organisation implemented its anti-corruption policies? Please tick any that are 
relevant, if possible identifying which stakeholders the measures apply to. 
 
[Board of Directors = 1;  
Investors/shareholders = 2;   
Employees  = 3;   
NGOs or independent bodies  = 4;   
Customers/clients = 5;     
Government agencies = 6;  
Aspects of the supply chain = 7;   
Other (please specify) =8] 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO 70 55 3 35 
Introduced codes of conduct/best practice 
1, 3, 7 1, 3  
1, 2, 3, 
4, 7 
Provided training sessions/workshops in-house 
   
3, 4, 6, 
7 
Used training/workshops provided by external organisation     
Meetings or announcements    1, 3, 7 
Provided training videos/DVDs     
Provided online/electronic training materials     
Provided online information/ publicity materials 
   
1, 3, 5, 
7 
Provided written materials  1, 3 1, 3 1, 3 
Introduced a signed agreement 3, 7    
Contractual condition  
3, 7   
1, 3, 5, 
7 
Other (please specify) Informal audit 
process – 3, 7    
 
11. Which approaches, if any, has your organisation used to ensure that its anti-corruption policies are 
complied with?  Tick any that are relevant. 
 
  [Yes = 1, No = 0] 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO 70 55 3 35 
●                                  Auditing         
Internal auditing of accounts 1 0 0 0 
Internal auditing of other records  1 0 0 0 
External auditing (through private body) 0 1 1 1 
●                      Personnel and Management         
Appointment of compliance officer(s)/team(s) 0 0 0 0 
Involvement of independent non-executive director(s) 1 0 1 1 
Identification of composition of Board of Directors 1 0 0 1 
Identification of management personnel 1 0 0 1 
●                                  Internal Procedures and Processes         
Incorporating compliance into staff appraisal system 1 0 0 1 
Disclosure of financial statements 0 0 0 1 
Regulation of remuneration within the organisation 1 0 0 1 
Regulation of nomination within the organisation 1 0 0 1 
Regulation of Director’s shareholdings 1 0 0 1 
Adopting measures for appointment of suppliers and similar 1 0 0 1 
In-house monitoring of suppliers and similar 1 0 0 1 
Penalties for breach of the anti-corruption policy 1 0 1 1 
In-house confidential hotline or reporting procedure 1 0 0 1 
Other 'whistle-blowing' measures (please specify) 0 0 0 0 
●                                   External Procedures and Processes         
Enforcement by government agency 0 0 0 0 
Monitoring by industry-specific body 0 0 0 0 
Monitoring by NGO 0 0 0 0 
Monitoring by other body (please specify) 0 0 0 0 
Other (please specify) 0 0 0 0 
 
12. To what extent do you feel that these approaches HAVE ACTUALLY HELPED TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE 
with anti-corruption policies within your organisation? Please tick the most relevant response on the scale, 
indicating whether you think the approach has been effective or ineffective. 
 
[Not relevant = 0 
Highly effective = 1 
Somewhat effective = 2 
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Neither effective nor ineffective = 3 
Somewhat ineffective = 4 
Highly ineffective = 5 
Don’t know = 6 
No response = 7] 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO/response 70 55 3 35 
Internal auditing of accounts 1 7 7 1 
Internal auditing of other records 1 7 7 7 
External auditing (through private body) 0 2 6 1 
Appointment of compliance officer(s)/team(s) 0 7 7 1 
Involvement of independent non-executive director(s) 1 7 6 1 
Identification of composition of Board of Directors 1 7 7 1 
Identification of management personnel 1 7 7 7 
Incorporating compliance into staff appraisal system 1 7 7 2 
Disclosure of financial statements 0 7 7 1 
Regulation of remuneration within the organisation 1 7 7 1 
Regulation of nomination within the organisation 1 7 7 1 
Regulation of Director’s shareholdings 1 7 7 1 
Adopting measures for appointment of suppliers and similar 1 7 7 1 
In-house monitoring of suppliers and similar 1 7 7 1 
Penalties for breach of the anti-corruption policy 1 7 7 1 
In-house confidential hotline or reporting procedure 1 7 7 2 
Other 'whistle-blowing' measures (please specify) 0 7 7 2 
Enforcement by government agency 0 7 7 2 
Monitoring by industry-specific body 0 7 7 2 
Monitoring by NGO 0 7 7 2 
Monitoring by other body (please specify) 0 7 7 2 
Other (please specify) 7 7 7 7 
 
13(A) Have you had any reported instances or allegations of corruption within your organisation, within the 
past 12 months?  
Yes      IF YOU ANSWERED ‘YES’ PLEASE GIVE FURTHER DETAILS IN 13(B)  
No        IF YOU ANSWERED ‘NO’ PLEASE GO STRAIGHT TO QUESTION 14 
[Yes = 1, No = 0] 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO  
70 0 
55 0 
3 0 
35 0 
 
 
13 (B) Please give further details relating to the incident(s) or allegation(s) of corruption: 
● How many instances or allegations of corruption have you had in the last 12 months? 
● Which aspects of corruption were involved in the allegation(s) or incident(s)? Please tick all that are 
relevant 
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SECTION 3: ANTI-CORRUPTION INFLUENCES AND MECHANISMS 
14. To what extent, if at all, do you consider the following have influenced your organisation’s behaviour in 
relation to corruption? Please circle the number which you consider is most appropriate, with 1 indicating that the 
source has had no influence at all and 10 indicating that the source has been extremely influential. Circle X to 
indicate ‘don’t know’ or that you are not aware of the source. 
 
['x' = 11, no response =12)] 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO 70 55 3 35 
International law (for example, agreements or conventions) 10 4 11 10 
Industry specific codes or initiatives 10 4 11 10 
General voluntary initiatives (for example, voluntary codes, coalitions, guidelines) 3 4 3 9 
National laws in the main country of operation   10 4 11 10 
National laws in other countries of operation 3 4 11 9 
[National] Government policies 10 12 11 9 
Influence of NGOs or pressure groups 1 12 11 9 
Consumer/client demand 1 12 11 9 
Attitudes of general public 1 12 11 9 
Employee demand 9 12 11 9 
Shareholder demand 9 12 11 9 
Corporate ethical values 10 8 5 8 
Protection of corporate reputation 10 12 5 8 
Wish to remain competitive 1 12 5 8 
Economic benefits/operational efficiency 1 12 5 9 
Stock exchange listing requirements 10 12 11 10 
Other (please specify) 12 12 12 12 
 
15. For sources which you identified in question 14, above, please provide further details where possible. 
(For example, identifying or commenting on particular agreements, bodies or laws).  
 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO.  
70 Unit non-response 
55 Unit non-response 
3 Unit non-response 
35 Unit non-response 
 
16. Do you consider that the following SPECIFIC SOURCES OF RULES have had any impact on your 
organisation’s behaviour or approach to corruption? Please circle the number which you consider is most 
appropriate, with 1 indicating that the source has had no influence at all and 10 indicating that the source has been 
extremely influential. Circle X to indicate ‘don’t know’ or that you are not aware of the source. 
 
[, 'x' = 11, no response =12)] 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO 70 55 3 35 
International and Regional Instruments     
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) 1 3 11 9 
OECD Convention on the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions 1 3 11 9 
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 1 1 11 5 
SADC Protocol against Corruption  1 1 11 6 
ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption 1 1 11 6 
The Inter-American Convention against Corruption (OAS Convention) 1 3 11 6 
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 1 3 11 6 
Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption  1 3 11 6 
National Measures     
US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act  10 7 11 3 
US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 1 3 11 3 
US False Claims Act 1 12 11 3 
UK Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 1 1 11 3 
UK Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 1 1 11 7 
UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 1 1 11 3 
UK Fraud Act 2006 1 1 12 3 
London Stock Exchange Combined Code on Corporate Governance 10 6 1 10 
General Listings Rules of London Stock Exchange 10 6 1 10 
Listings Rules of New York Stock Exchange 1 1 11 2 
Listings Rules of Johannesburg Stock Exchange 1 1 11 2 
Listings Rules of Hong Kong Stock Exchange 1 1 11 7 
Multilateral Instruments     
United Nations Global Compact  1 2 11 2 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 1 2 11 3 
International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Conduct on Combating Extortion and Bribery 1 2 11 3 
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Partnering Against Corruption (PACI) Principles for Countering Bribery 1 2 11 5 
Transparency International Business Principles for Countering Bribery 1 2 11 5 
Other (please specify) 1 12 11 12 
 
17. Do you consider that the following influence your organisation’s behaviour in relation to corruption? 
Please tick the most relevant response on the scale.  
 
No influence at all on behaviour= 1  
Not very influential = 2  
Neutral = 3  
Some influence on behaviour = 4  
Substantial influence on behaviour = 5  
Don’t know = 6  
No response = 7 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO 70 55 3 35 
Government fines 4 1 3 7 
Individual imprisonment 
5 4 4 
[6, 
7] 
Refusal/revocation of government licences/permits 4 2 4 3 
Government incentives to comply 2 1 3 5 
Exclusion from stock exchange 5 3 4 5 
Shareholder action 7 1 4 5 
Loss of new business opportunities 4 1 4 5 
Potential for economic loss 4 1 4 5 
Sanctions by trade associations 3 1 3 5 
Pressure from NGOs 3 1 3 4 
Consumer boycotts 3 1 3 5 
Damage to reputation through media coverage 5 1 4 5 
Public access to information (e.g. results of audits, disclosure 
of payments made) 7 1 4 5 
Other (please specify) ETHICS OF COMPLYING WITH 
LAW - 5 7 7 7 
 
18. To what extent, if at all, are you opposed to, or in favour of, an INCREASE in the following measures or 
actions, for the purpose of combating corruption? Please tick the most relevant response on the scale. 
 
Strongly opposed to increase = 1  
Somewhat opposed to increase = 2  
Neither opposed nor in favour = 3  
Somewhat in favour of increase = 4  
Highly in favour of increase = 5  
Don’t know = 6  
No response = 7 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO 70 55 3 35 
The number of government regulations applied to organizations 1 2 3 3 
The stringency of government regulations applied to organizations 1 2 2 3 
Greater harmonisation of regulations across and within jurisdictions 5 4 3 3 
The frequency of government enforcement activities applied to organisations 4 3 2 2 
The thoroughness of government enforcement activities applied to organisations 4 3 3 3 
The level of sanction imposed by government agencies following non-compliance with 
regulations 4 3 3 3 
The probability of sanctions being imposed by government agencies following non-
compliance with regulations 5 3 3 3 
Collaboration within your specific industry to produce voluntary standards or other voluntary 
initiatives 3 5 3 3 
Collaboration with a coalition or range of stakeholders to produce voluntary standards or other 
voluntary initiatives 3 3 3 3 
Collaboration between industry to produce standards or measures to be enforced by an 
independent agency 2 3 3 7 
Collaboration with a coalition or range of stakeholders to produce standards or measures to be 
enforced by an independent agency 2 3 3 4 
The standardisation of corporate codes of practice 4 3 4 4 
Increased pressure from senior management/Board of Directors to combat corruption 5 3 3 4 
Increased compliance with existing anti-corruption measures or initiatives by competitors 5 5 3 4 
Increased training and education measures aimed at organization’s senior management or 
directors 4 3 4 4 
Increased training and education measures aimed at organization’s staff members at other 
levels  4 3 4 4 
Increased training and education measures aimed at the general public 3 3 4 5 
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19. If you were asked to sign your organisation up to a new anti-corruption initiative, to what extent, if at all, 
would the following factors INCREASE OR DECREASE the likelihood of you signing? Please circle the number 
which you consider is most appropriate, with 1 indicating that the factor would strongly decrease the likelihood of 
signing and 10 indicating that the factor would strongly increase the likelihood of signing.  Circle X to indicate ‘don’t 
know’. 
 
['x' = 11, no response =12)] 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO 70 55 3 35 
The opportunity for a high level of input into the negotiation and development of the initiative 7 8 3 7 
The inclusion of a broad range of similar organisations in the negotiation and development 
process 5 8 4 6 
The involvement of multi-country NGOs or similar bodies in the negotiation and development 
of the initiative   6 2 3 5 
The involvement of local (national or smaller) NGOs or similar bodies in the negotiation and 
development of the initiative 6 2 3 5 
The involvement of consumers in the negotiation and development of the initiative 5 2 4 5 
The initiative having the status of a binding international legal instrument (e.g. a treaty or 
convention) 8 8 4 6 
The initiative having the status of a voluntary agreement 4 3 3 5 
The provision for enforcement of the initiative by an external body 7 8 4 4 
The provision for enforcement of the initiative internally (each organisation conducting its own 
enforcement) 6 2 3 7 
The belief that the initiative would actually be enforced 9 8 5 7 
A major competitor signing up to the initiative 12 12 4 12 
A major competitor refusing to sign up to the initiative 3 12 4 12 
The provision that organisations would be free to implement the initiative in their own preferred 
manner 3 4 3 6 
A requirement for standardised implementation 6 8 4 6 
The likelihood that competitors will comply 7 8 3 7 
A high level of external pressure to achieve the initiative (e.g. from consumers or the general 
public)  4 6 3 3 
The initiative reflecting the organisation’s own ‘ethics’ or ‘morals’ 10 5 5 7 
 
20. Additional information.  
Please use this space to provide any additional information you feel is relevant about your own anti-
corruption policies and/or measures or other points related to the prevention and combating of corruption. 
Continue on a separate sheet if necessary. 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO  
70 NONE 
55 NONE 
3 NONE 
35 NONE 
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Appendix II: Questions and Responses: NGOs 
Self-identifying information and similar have been removed to preserve anonymity. 
 
SECTION 1: YOUR ORGANISATION'S IDENTITY 
1[A] Where is your head office? 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO  
161 USA 
116 UK 
27 USA 
 
1[B] Please list the countries where your organisation operates. Continue on a separate sheet if necessary. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
NO.   
161 
USA, 'we are based in the United States, but conduct training and workshops around the 
world each year. Our membership is made of companies and intermediaries that are based 
around the world'. 
116 
Australia, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, the Netherlands, 
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, the United States and the UK 
27 U.S. 
 
2. At what level(s) does your organisation operate? Tick any that are relevant. 
[1 = yes, 0 = no] 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. LOCAL NATIONAL REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL 
161 0 0 0 1 
116 1 1 1 1 
27 0 1 0 0 
 
3. Is your organisation affiliated or linked with any of the following? Tick any that are relevant. 
[1 = yes, 0 = no] 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
Government/government 
agency or agencies       
o         Domestic/national 0 0 0 
o         Foreign 0 0 0 
Political party/parties 0 0 0 
Academic institution(s) 0 0 1 
Business(es) 1 0 0 
International organisation(s) 0 0 0 
Regional organisation 0 0 0 
Donor agency or agencies 0 1 0 
Religious organisations 0 0 0 
Other (please specify) 0 
1 CIVIL SOCIETY 
ORGANISATIONS, NGOS 
1 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE - WE ARE 
INDEPENDENT BUT HAVE A STRONG 
RELATIONSHIP. 
 
4[A] Which of the following are sources of funding for your organisation? Tick any that are relevant. 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
Government agencies 0 0 0 
o        Domestic/national 0 0 0 
o        Foreign 0 0 0 
Political party/parties 0 0 0 
Embassy/High Commission 0 0 0 
Multilateral or international donor agencies 0 1 1 
Private donors or foundations 0 0 0 
Individual members or supporters 0 0 1 
Academic institutions 0 1 0 
Other NGOs 1 0 0 
Business(es) 0 0 0 
Donor agency/agencies 0 0 0 
Religious organizations 0 0 1 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE 
Other (please specify)    
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4 [B] Please provide further details of funding sources referred to above, if possible. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
NO. 160 116 27 
 
Our member companies pay 
an annual membership fee. 
A combination of international NGOs and foundations 
fund the coalition's activities at local, regional and 
global levels.  
 
5. Which of the following stakeholders, if any, do you work with and/or target? Tick any that are relevant. 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
The general public 0 0 1 
Activists       
o        Individuals 0 0 0 
o        Collectives 0 0 0 
Local interest groups 0 1 0 
NGOs       
o        Local 0 1 0 
o        National  0 1 1 
o        International 0 1 1 
Trade Unions 0 1 0 
Schools 0 0 0 
Academic faculties or universities 0 0 1 
International organisations 1 1 1 
Regional organisations 0 1 0 
Scientists and/or engineers 0 0 0 
Legal profession 1 0 0 
Banking profession 1 0 0 
Insurance companies 0 0 0 
Auditors 0 1 0 
Accountants 1 1 0 
Businesses       
o        Multinational Corporations (MNCs)  1 1 1 
o        Small to medium enterprises (SMEs) 1 1 0 
o        Other (please specify) 1 0 0 
Government agencies       
o        Domestic/national 0 1 0 
o        Foreign 0 1 0 
Political party/parties 0 0 0 
Embassies/High Commission(s) 0 1 0 
Chambers of Commerce 1 0 1 
Industry, trade or professional bodies 1 1 1 
Journalists and media 0 1 0 
Donor agencies 0 1 0 
Religious organisations 0 0 0 
Other (please specify) 0 0 0 
 
6. Please provide detail on the types of work your organisation is involved with. Tick any responses that are 
relevant: 
 
POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
• Which of the following, if any, does your organisation undertake? 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
Making proposals for policy or law reform 0 1 1 
Publication of papers 1 1 1 
Consultations with ministers or government bodies 0 1 0 
Consultations with Embassies/High Commissions 0 1 0 
Involvement in negotiations or development of:       
o        National law or policy 0 1 0 
o        International legal instruments 1 1 0 
o        Regional legal instruments 0 1 0 
o        Industry/sector specific codes and other initiatives 1 1 0 
o        Government/public sector codes and other initiatives 0 1 0 
o        Business policies or codes 1 1 0 
o        Other (please specify) 0 0 0 
Other (please specify) 0 0 0 
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• Which stakeholders, if any, does your organisation seek to influence? 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
Governments 0 1 0 
o        Domestic/national 0 1 0 
o        Foreign 0 0 0 
Political party/parties 0 0 0 
Embassies/High Commission(s) 0 1 0 
International organisations 0 1 0 
Regional organisations 0 0 1 
Other NGOs 0 0 1 
The general public       
Businesses: 1 1 1 
o         Multinational Corporations (MNCs)  1 1 1 
o         Small to medium enterprises (SMEs)  
1. The overseas 
intermediaries of 
MNCs and SMEs 0 0 
o         Other (please specify) 0 0 0 
Other (please specify)    
 
CAMPAIGNING AND ACTIVISM 
• Which of the following, if any, does your organisation undertake? 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
Lobbying directed at       
o        Governments       
Domestic/national 0 1 0 
Foreign 0 1 0 
o        Embassies/High Commission(s)  0 1 0 
o        International organisations 0 1 0 
o        Regional organisations 0 1 0 
o        Businesses:       
Multinational Corporations (MNCs)  0 1 0 
Small to medium enterprises (SMEs)  0 1 0 
Other (please specify) 0 0 0 
o        Private sector/industry associations 0 1 0 
o        Other (please specify) 0 0 0 
Boycotting of products 0 0 0 
Boycotting of businesses:       
o        Multinational Corporations (MNCs)  0 0 0 
o        Small to medium enterprises (SMEs)  0 0 0 
o        Other (please specify) 0 0 0 
Boycotting of governments, regimes or countries 0 0 0 
Protests, demonstrations, rallies 0 0 0 
Mobilization of public for a cause 0 0 0 
Litigation or legal representation 0 0 0 
Joining or developing coalitions 0 1 0 
Attendance at meetings, workshops, conferences 1 1 1 
Letter writing 0 1 0 
Other advocacy (please specify) 0 0 0 
Other (please specify) 
1. We work with our member companies to 
ensure that they are aware of local, national and 
international developments in anti-corruption 
policy and the enforcement of anti-corruption 
laws. We also conduct due diligence on and 
provide training to commercial third parties that 
work with our multinational member countries to 
ensure that they are conducting their business in 
a transparent manner. 0 0 
 
● At what level(s) is your campaigning targeted? Tick any that are relevant. 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
Local 0 1 Unit non-response 
National 0 1 Unit non-response 
Regional 0 1 Unit non-response 
International 1 1 Unit non-response 
 
RESEARCH and MONITORING 
• Which of the following, if any, does your organisation undertake? 
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QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
Analysis of policies, issues 0 1 1 
Synthesis of existing research or publications 0 1 1 
Empirical or action research and surveys 0 0 1 
Benchmarking 1 0 1 
Production or provision of toolkits for monitoring/enforcement 1 0 0 
Application of toolkits for monitoring/enforcement 0 1 0 
Monitoring of public programmes or policies on own behalf 0 1 0 
Monitoring of public programmes or policies on behalf of other stakeholders (please specify) 0 0 0 
Compliance or performance monitoring of businesses on own behalf 0 1 0 
Compliance or performance monitoring of businesses on behalf of other stakeholders (please 
specify) 0 0 0 
Monitoring the projects or policies of other organisations (please specify) on own behalf 0 1 0 
Monitoring the projects or policies of other organisations (please specify) on behalf of other 
stakeholders (please specify) 0 0 0 
Other (please specify) 0 0 0 
 
• Does, or has, your organisation undertaken research or monitoring JOINTLY/IN COLLABORATION WITH 
OR ON BEHALF OF any of the following? Tick any that are relevant. 
JOINTLY/IN COLLABORATION WITH  
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
National governments 0 1 0 
Political party/parties 0 0 0 
International organisations 1 0 1 
Regional organisations 0 0 0 
Businesses:       
o        Multinational Corporations (MNCs)  1 1 0 
o        Small to medium enterprises (SMEs) 1 1 0 
o        Other (please specify) 0 0 0 
Private sector/industry associations 0 0 0 
NGOs       
o        Local 0 1 0 
o        National  0 1 0 
o        International 1 1 1 
Schools 0 0 0 
Academic faculties or universities 0 0 1 
Other (please specify) 0 0 0 
 
ON BEHALF OF  
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
National governments 0 0 0 
Political party/parties 0 0 0 
International organisations 0 0 0 
Regional organisations 0 0 0 
Businesses:       
o        Multinational Corporations (MNCs)  1 0 0 
o        Small to medium enterprises (SMEs) 1 0 0 
o        Other (please specify) 0 0 0 
Private sector/industry associations 0 0 0 
NGOs       
o        Local 0 0 0 
o        National  0 0 0 
o        International 0 0 0 
Schools 0 0 0 
Academic faculties or universities 0 0 0 
Other (please specify) 0 0 0 
 
NETWORKING AND COLLABORATION 
• Does your organisation collaborate with other bodies or organisations for any of the following? 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
Information sharing 1 1 1 
Resource sharing 0 1 0 
Development and/or implementation of policies or programmes 0 1 1 
Other (please specify) 0 0 0 
 
• Is your organisation a member of  
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
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A coalition or network of NGOs 0 1 0 
A multi-stakeholder coalition or network 0 1 0 
Other network (please give details) 0 0 0 
 
Does your organisation collaborate with any government enforcement agencies? If yes, please identify the 
agencies. 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
 0 UNR UNR 
 
CAPACITY BUILDING AND PROVISION OF SERVICES 
Which of the following, if any, does your organisation provide or undertake? Please tick any that are 
relevant, if possible identifying which stakeholders the activities apply to. 
Other NGOs = 1;  
General public = 2;  
Businesses = 3;  
Government agencies = 4;  
Other (please specify) = 5;  
No response = 6 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
Training 3, 4 1 3 
Assistance with development of policies or programmes 3 1 3 
Advice or recommendations 3 1 3 
Consultancy services  1 3 
Production of guidelines 3 1 2, 3 
Production or provision of decision-making tools   3 
Application of decision-making tools (to stakeholders)    
Production or provision of compliance toolkits 3   
Application of compliance tools (to stakeholders)  1  
Provision of manuals or guidebooks 3 1  
Working with local community leaders  1  
Citizens report cards    
Providing anonymous reporting mechanism(s) 3   
Working with other local representatives (please specify)    
Other (please specify)     
 
AWARENESS RAISING 
• Which of the following, if any, does your organisation provide or undertake? 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
Outreach work with        
Local community or community groups 0 1 1 
Schools 0 0 1 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs)  1 0 1 
Small to medium enterprises (SMEs)  1 1 1 
Other (please specify) 0 0 0 
Provision of education programmes or courses on website  1. And live 0 1 
Provision of education programmes or courses in print 0 0 0 
Policy updates or briefings on website   1 1 0 
Policy updates or briefings  in print 0 0 0 
Newsletters on website   1 1 1 
Newsletters  in print 0 0 0 
Research results and/or reports on website   0 1 1 
Research results and/or reports  in print 0 0 1 
Database of materials (please give details)  on website   1. We maintain a database of the gifts 
and hospitality rules and laws and 
regulations regarding the retention of 
commercial third intermediaries in over 
70 countries. 
0 
0 
Database of materials (please give details)   in print 0 0 0 
Other (please specify)on website   0 0 0 
Other (please specify)  in print 0 0 0 
Use of broadcast media (TV, radio, newspapers, short 
films) 
1 1 
0 
Use of information technology and new media (websites, 
blogs, podcasts) 1 1 0 
Use of dance, street theatre or plays 0 0 0 
Use of songs or poetry 0 0 0 
Use of comics, or visual art forms 0 0 0 
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Use of posters, leaflets and/or billboards 0 0 0 
Other (please specify)  0 0 0 
 
• Which of the following, if any, does your organisation provide or undertake? Please tick any that are 
relevant, if possible identifying which stakeholders the activities apply to (e.g. which stakeholders are 
participants). 
 
Other NGOs = 1;  
General public =2;   
Businesses = 3;   
Government agencies = 4;   
Other (please specify) =5;  
No response = 6 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
Hosting conferences 3, 4 1 1, 3, 4 
Provision of seminars or workshops 3, 4 1 3 
Informal forums or discussion 3, 4 1  
Provision of  other educational resources 3  3 
Other  (please specify)    
 
SECTION 2: CSR AND CORRUPTION 
 
7. Does your organisation actively promote or support ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) initiatives? 
(1 = yes, 0 = no). 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
 1 1 0 
 
8. CSR priorities 
Below is a list of some different aspects of corporate social responsibility. Please rank these aspects on a scale of 1 - 
6 according to the extent to which they are actively prioritised by your organisation.  
Rank aspects that are highly prioritised ‘1’ and rank aspects that are least prioritised ‘6’.   You may replace a 
number with 'X' if you do not consider the aspect to be relevant. 
[x = 7] 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
Environmental protection 7 7  
Equality and anti-discrimination 7 7  
Labour rights and standards 7 7  
Corruption 1 1  
Health and Safety 7 7  
Human rights 7 7  
 
9. Do you think that promotion or support of CSR initiatives may be relevant to your organisation in the 
future? Please give reasons. Continue on a separate sheet if necessary. 
Questionnaire 
no.  
160 The adoption of corporate codes of social responsibility, especially in the area of anti-corruption 
initiatives will continue to be a priority for our organization. 
116 
Unit non response-not relevant 
 
27 We take an enterprise view of business ethics so we tend to view CSR initiatives as very 
important, but mostly in terms of how organizations create value for their shareholders. 
 
10. Overall, to what extent, if at all, do you consider the involvement of the following has led to an 
improvement in corporate social responsibility? Please circle the number which you consider is most appropriate, 
with 1 indicating that the source has had no impact at all and 10 indicating that the source has had a significant impact. 
Circle X to indicate ‘don’t know’ or that you are not aware of the source. 
[X =11, NO RESPONSE = 12] 
Questionnaire no. 160 116 27 
The general public 4 12 8 
Activists       
Individuals  5 12 5 
Collectives 5 12 9 
Local interest groups 7 12 6 
NGOs       
Local 6 12 8 
National 6 12 7 
International 7 12 6 
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Trade Unions 8 12 2 
Schools 5 12 2 
Academic faculties or universities 5 12 4 
International organisations 8 12 2 
Regional organisations 8 12 5 
Scientists and/or engineers 5 12 3 
Legal profession 7 12 2 
Banking profession 4 12 1 
Insurance companies 4 12 1 
Auditors 6 12 4 
Accountants 6 12 4 
Businesses       
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 7 12 7 
Small to medium enterprises (SMEs) 7 12 2 
Other 12 12 11 
Government agencies       
Domestic/national 9 12 3 
Foreign 9 12 5 
Political parties 4 12 2 
Chambers of Commerce 6 12 4 
Industry, trade or professional bodies 6 12 7 
Journalists and media 7 12 9 
Donor agencies  5 12 4 
Religious organisations 4 12 4 
Other (please specify) 12 12 12 
11. Does your organisation have any policies, programs or activities in place that are directly related to 
corruption?  
Questionnaire no. 160 116 27 
 1 1 0 
 
12. Which sectors are targeted or included in these policies, programmes or activities? Tick any that are 
relevant 
Questionnaire no. 160 116 27 
Private sector   1 1  
Public Sector   0 1  
Voluntary Sector    0 0  
Other (please specify 0 0  
 
13. Please outline the main focus of your work with respect to corruption. Which aspects of corruption are 
most relevant to your work?  Continue on a separate sheet if necessary. 
Questionnaire 
no.  
160 We focus mainly on commercial anti-bribery issues. We work with our membership to help them 
develop compliance programs, conduct training and perform due diligence on their overseas 
commercial intermediaries to ensure that they engaging in transparent business practices [sic]. 
We attempt to hold training workshops in each region annually. In some countries, we invite local 
government officials to participate in these training workshops in order to foster a discussion on 
anti-bribery issues between the government and the business community. We also provide our 
members with compliance tools such as guidebooks on various issues, such as eliminating the 
use of facilitation payments, as well as guidelines on various anti-bribery compliance initiatives 
such as how due diligence is necessary on various commercial third party relationships. These 
guidebooks and guidelines are contained on our resource center along with information of the 
gifts and hospitality laws and the laws regarding the retention of 3rd party intermediaries in over 
70 countries. 
116 
We help citizens of resource-rich developing countries hold their governments accountable for 
the management of revenues from the oil, gas and mining industries. Natural resource revenues 
are an important source of income for governments of over 50 developing countries, including 
Angola, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria and Venezuela. When properly managed these 
revenues should serve as a basis for poverty reduction, economic growth and development 
rather than exacerbating corruption, conflict and social divisiveness. 
… 
 
27  
 
14. Do you consider that your work has resulted in positive outcomes in combating corruption? Please make 
reference to specific approaches, cases, stakeholders or programmes. Continue on a separate sheet if 
necessary. 
Questionnaire  
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no. 
160 Yes, we do believe that our work has resulted in positive outcomes in combating corruption. We 
work with our member companies to make sure that they are aware of the detrimental effects 
that corruption has on society. One area of success has been helping our member companies 
ban the use of facilitation payments. Under the laws of the United States, Australia and Canada 
as well as several other countries, small payments to government officials in order to induce 
them to perform a non-discretionary, routine government action provide an affirmative defense to 
charges of transnational bribery. However, we believe that companies should prohibit facilitating 
payments, even if they are technically allowed in certain jurisdictions for a number of reasons: 1) 
it's still a bribe; 2) allowing employees to pay certain bribes but prohibiting other bribes sends a 
mixed message to employees; 3) government officials will repeatedly ask a company or 
individual that is willing to pay for additional bribes; and 4) making facilitating payments are risky 
because companies risk books and records violations and the determination by an investigation 
government that a payment does not qualify as a facilitating payment. We have drafted a 
guidebook on how companies can eliminate making facilitating payments and prohibit facilitating 
payments as a corporate policy. We have several member companies that were skeptical at first, 
but that have now successfully eliminated facilitating payments. They have found that it is 
actually easier to conduct business when government officials realize that they should not even 
bother to ask the company for a bribe. 
 
One of our initiatives that we are most proud of the launch of […] a web-based reporting 
mechanism that allows those that have been asked for a bribe to report the demand 
anonymously. The website asks a series of drop-down questions including country, the 
government agency of the bribe requestor, the amount of the bribe (within ranges), and the 
threatened harm if the bribe wasn't paid. We hope to report the results once we have statistically 
relevant data and use the information to help companies identify areas of risk and also to put 
pressure on governments to increase their commitment to transparency. 
116 
-International Accounting Standards 
After intense lobbying, in November 2007 the European Parliament called for a new international 
accounting standard requiring oil, gas and mining companies to report critical financial 
information, such as payments to governments, on a country-by-country basis. 
 
-Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative EITI 
The coalition has been heavily involved in a voluntary multi-stakeholder initiative, EITI, which 
sets a global standard for companies to publish what they pay and for governments to disclose 
what they receive. In September 2007, the EITI board passed 15 countries as 'candidate' 
countries, who can now progress towards full implementation of the initiative. 
27  
 
15. Which stakeholders, if any, does your organisation target as part of your anti-corruption work? 
Questionnaire no. 160 116 27 
The general public 0 0  
Activists       
o        Individuals 0 0  
o        Collectives 0 0  
Local interest groups 0 0  
NGOs       
o        Local 0 0  
o        National  0 0  
o        International 0 1  
Trade Unions 0 0  
Schools 0 0  
Academic faculties or universities 0 0  
International organisations 0 1  
Regional organisations 0 0  
Scientists and/or engineers 0 0  
Legal profession 0 0  
Banking profession 0 0  
Insurance companies 0 0  
Auditors 0 0  
Accountants 0 0  
Businesses       
o        Multinational Corporations (MNCs)  1 1  
o        Small to medium enterprises (SMEs) 1 1  
o        Other (please specify) 1 0  
Government agencies       
o        Domestic/national 0 1  
o        Foreign 1 1  
Political parties 0 0  
Embassies/High Commission(s) 0 0  
Chambers of Commerce 1 0  
Industry, trade or professional bodies 1 0  
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Journalists and media 0 0  
Donor agencies 0 0  
Religious organisations 0 0  
Other (please specify) 0 0  
 
16 [A] What are the greatest advantages or successes of working with these stakeholders? Please refer to the 
different types of stakeholder you have identified (if relevant). Continue on a separate sheet if necessary. 
Questionnaire 
no.  
160 The companies that join our organization are motivated to do the right thing and are eager for 
guidance on how to establish effective anti-bribery programs within their organizations. 
116  
27  
 
[B] What are the greatest challenges or limitations of working with these stakeholders? Please refer to the 
different types of stakeholder you have identified (if relevant).  Continue on a separate sheet if necessary. 
Questionnaire 
no.  
160 As I have stated, we deal mainly with businesses, therefore our organization focuses on the 
supply side of bribery. This provides limited opportunities to work on resolving demand-side 
issues. We have established an anonymous reporting mechanism to report requests for bribes, 
which we hope to use to confront the demand-side of bribery. 
116  
27  
 
17.  Are there any reasons why your organisation has not focused on corruption? Do you have plans to 
introduce any activities or policies focusing on corruption?  Continue on a separate sheet if necessary. 
Questionnaire 
no.  
160 Not applicable, we focus solely on anti-bribery and corruption issues. 
116 
The institute’s mission is to embed ethics into the everyday business decision-making and 
practice of organisations. While this, of course, includes corruption, it is much broader than that. 
There are other organisations much better equipped to deal with these issues and we support 
their efforts and rely on their findings in the work that we do. 
27  
 
18. To what extent, if at all, do you consider the following have assisted in combating corruption in 
international business? Please circle the number which you consider is most appropriate, with 1 indicating that the 
source has had no impact at all and 10 indicating that the source has had a significant impact. Circle X to indicate 
‘don’t know’ or that you are not aware of the source. 
 
[X =11, NO RESPONSE = 12] 
 
Questionnaire no. 160 116 27 
International law (for example, agreements or conventions) 9 12 6 
Industry specific codes or initiatives  8 12 8 
Other voluntary initiatives (for example, voluntary codes, 
guidelines) 7 12 8 
National laws in main country of operation 10 12 8 
National laws in other countries of operation 10 12 6 
[National] Government policies  9 12 4 
Influence of NGOs or pressure groups  8 12 10 
Consumer/client demand 7 12 9 
Attitudes of general public  4 12 10 
Employee demand within business organisations  5 12 9 
Shareholder demand within business organizations 6 12 5 
Corporate ethical values  8 12 9 
Desire of businesses to protect reputation 9 12 9 
Desire of businesses to remain competitive 6 12 6 
Economic benefits/operational efficiency  perceived by 
businesses 8 12 5 
Stock exchange listing requirements  9 12 5 
Other (please specify)  12 12 12 
 
19. For sources which you identified in question 18, above, please provide further details where possible. (For 
example, identifying or commenting on particular agreements, bodies or laws.)  
Questionnaire 
no.  
160 The heightened enforcement environment of FCPA violations in the United States [sic] and now 
abroad has probably been the biggest motivator for companies to establish anti-corruption 
policies. This is combined with a company's desire to protect its reputation. A company generally 
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does not want to see a front page story about a government investigation into corrupt payments 
made by its executives, and there have been several instances of country-wide boycotts of a 
company because of allegations of corrupt payments. 
116  
27  
 
20. Do you consider that the following SPECIFIC SOURCES OF RULES have had any impact on the behaviour 
or approach of business organisations regarding corruption? Please circle the number which you consider is 
most appropriate, with 1 indicating that the source had no influence at all and 10 indicating that the source was 
extremely influential. Circle X to indicate ‘don’t know’ or that you are not aware of the source. 
 
[X =11, NO RESPONSE = 12] 
 
 
 
Questionnaire no. 160 116 27 
International and Regional Instruments        
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)  9 12 6 
OECD Convention on the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions 9 12 7 
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption  4 12 11 
SADC Protocol against Corruption 4 12 11 
ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption 4 12 11 
The Inter-American Convention against Corruption (OAS Convention) 5 12 11 
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 5 12 11 
Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption   5 12 11 
Other (please specify) 12 12 12 
National Measures       
US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act   10 12 8 
US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 10 12 8 
US False Claims Act 7 12 3 
UK Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 7 12 11 
UK Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998  7 12 11 
UK Proceeds of  Crime Act 2002  3 12 11 
London Stock Exchange Combined Code on Corporate Governance 5 12 4 
General Listings Rules of London Stock Exchange 5 12 5 
Listings Rules of New York Stock Exchange 5 12 7 
Listings Rules of Johannesburg Stock Exchange  5 12 11 
Listings Rules of Hong Kong Stock Exchange 5 12 11 
Other (please specify) 12 12 12 
Multilateral Instruments       
United Nations Global Compact  7 12 6 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 8 12 5 
International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Conduct on Combating Extortion and Bribery 8 12 4 
Partnering Against Corruption (PACI) Principles for Countering Bribery 8 12 11 
Transparency International Business Principles for Countering Bribery 8 12 7 
Other (please specify) 12 12 11 
Other instruments (please specify) 12 12 11 
 
21. Overall, what do you consider to be:  
[A] The greatest strengths of existing anti-corruption instruments? Please give examples. 
Questionnaire 
no.  
160 Multilateral anti-corruption instruments such as the UN Convention Against Corruption and the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, reach a number of different countries and provide a high 
standard for countries that have signed onto these conventions. This creates a level playing field 
for businesses and hopefully will increase transparency in those countries that have ratified 
these instruments. 
116  
27  
 
[B] The greatest limitations of existing anti-corruption instruments? Please give examples. 
Questionnaire 
no.  
160 The largest limitation of existing anti-corruption instruments is that there are so many of them 
and they often have conflicting provisions. There are two international conventions and at least 
six different regional conventions all with different provisions. For example facilitating payments 
are treated differently under the different conventions. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is 
silent on the issue of facilitating payments, however the un convention against corruption 
prohibits them. Countries such as the united states that permit facilitating payments, have ratified 
both conventions and are clearly not complying with the requirements of the un convention. 
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116  
27 Corruption does not happen in a vacuum. Instruments should guage other socio-economic 
factors for correspondence and see if there might be some new approaches to fighting 
corruption. 
 
22. Do you think that local conditions should be taken into account when developing and implementing anti-
corruption instruments? Please give examples. 
Questionnaire 
no.  
160 Local conditions should be taken into account when developing and implementing anti-corruption 
instruments if it means that less-developed countries will receive more guidance and support 
from international organizations on steps that they can take to find and eliminate corruption in 
their own countries. If taking local conditions into account means that a certain level of corruption 
should be expected in some countries, then no, local conditions should not be taken into account 
when developing and implementing anti-corruption instruments. Corruption should not be 
excused because countries are so poor that they cannot pay their government officials adequate 
salaries and those officials need to supplement their income with bribe money. By excusing 
these conditions, those countries would have no incentive to increase transparency within their 
own governments, leading to a continued cycle of poverty. 
 
Local customs are another question. Should anti-corruption instruments take into account local 
gift-giving holidays and other local customs when there is no corrupt intent attached with items or 
received? To some extent the language of anti-corruption instruments already take local customs 
into considerations [sic]. For example "gifts must be customary under the circumstances" is a 
phrase that appears in some national laws. 
116  
27 Yes - see my answer to 21b. One thing you learn from research is to collect lots of data an link 
your data to other data sets where applicable. There are often surprises hidden in the numbers, 
and perhaps indices to innovative approaches to problems. 
 
23. Additional information.  
Please use this space to provide any additional information you feel is relevant about your own anti-
corruption policies and /or measures or other points related to the prevention and combating of corruption. 
Continue on a separate sheet if necessary 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 160 116 27 
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